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The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists 
ANYA BERNSTEIN†  
INTRODUCTION 
The No Fly List, which is used to block suspected 
terrorists from flying, has been in use for years. But the 
government still appears “stymied” by the “relatively 
straightforward question” of what people who “believe they 
have been wrongly included on” that list should do.1 In 
recent months, courts have haltingly started to provide 
their own answer, giving some individuals standing to sue 
to remove their names or receive additional process.2 This 
step is particularly important as the No Fly List continues 
  
† Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School. 
J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Anthropology, The University of Chicago. Thanks 
to Daniel Abebe, Ian Ayres, Alexander Boni-Saenz, Anthony Casey, Anjali 
Dalal, Nicholas Day, Bernard Harcourt, Aziz Huq, Jerry Mashaw, Jonathan 
Masur, Nicholas Parrillo, Victoria Schwartz, Lior Strahilevitz, Laura Weinrib, 
Michael Wishnie, and James Wooten for helpful commentary.   
 1. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (characterizing the 
government’s response to questions at oral argument).  
 2. Id. (holding that United States citizens and legal, permanent residents 
who suspect they are listed on the No Fly List have standing to sue for an 
injunction ordering the government to remove their names or to provide 
additional process); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 999 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (noting the same for an alien with substantial voluntary connections 
to the United States). Because the criteria for adding someone to the No Fly List 
are secret, it will no doubt be a challenge for both courts and government to 
determine how to implement any additional process due to those listed on it. 
Peter Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 804, 837-54 (2007) (outlining a due process regime that takes into 
account both the rights of individuals and the needs of the government).  
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its breathtaking growth.3 It is unclear, however, how a court 
will evaluate that additional process when the listing 
criteria are both secret and untested. This doctrinal 
development poses a challenge not only to the No Fly List, 
but also to the complex watch list infrastructure on which it 
is built.  
The No Fly List draws on a consolidated terrorist watch 
list that compiles numerous other lists maintained by a 
number of federal agencies.4 Agencies compiling their lists 
receive information not only from their own agents but from 
state governments, foreign nations, and private 
individuals.5 The No Fly List is well known because it has 
visible effects like impinging on rights to travel. Indeed, it is 
precisely such effects that have led courts to recognize 
standing to challenge them.6 But the No Fly List’s flaws are 
inherited from the lists it uses. They, in turn, remain 
largely unregulated, unappealable, and obscured from 
public attention.  
Commentators have argued that such watch lists raise 
problems for privacy and due process rights.7 This Article 
  
 3. See Associated Press, U.S. No-Fly List Doubles in One Year, U.S.A. TODAY 
(Feb. 2, 2012, 11:02 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-02/no-fly-
list/52926968/1 (reporting that the No Fly List increased from “about 10,000 
known or suspected terrorists one year ago to about 21,000” in February 2012).  
 4. Shane, supra note 2, at 807-08. 
 5. The precise number of watch lists, as well as of names on watch lists, is 
difficult to ascertain because publicly available information is limited. See id. at 
813-14 (tabulating watch lists maintained by federal agencies). For instance, 
while internal FBI documents reveal the construction of a new Known and 
Suspected Terrorist list in 2009, there is no public information about this list. 
CJIS Advisory Policy Board Working Group Meetings Spring 2009, Staff Paper 
4-5 (document produced in FOIA litigation) (Bates No. NCIC-VGTOF-8334-35) 
(on file with author). The FBI has not published a System of Records Notice 
about the new list in the Federal Register, as required by statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 
552a(e)(4) (2006) (providing no relevant System of Records Notice).  
 6. See, e.g., Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 987, 993-94 (determining that plaintiff had 
standing because being placed on the No Fly List restricted her ability to travel 
even when the destination was not the United States and restricted her ability 
to associate with others by attending academic conferences). 
 7. See Michael German & Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?, 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 3 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-
liberty/whats-wrong-fusion-centers-executive-summary. 
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broadens the frame, moving beyond individual rights to the 
broader effects that watch lists have on the agents and 
agencies who run them, the government that commissions 
them, and the society that houses them. It also explains 
why agencies currently lack the incentives to address these 
problems themselves. Because current law fails to rein 
watch lists in, they require external constraint. Focusing on 
watch lists’ peculiar epistemological and social structure, 
this Article identifies the key aspects of watch list creation 
that require regulation. And it draws on developments in 
regulatory theory to ground its proposals for reform.  
This Article starts with the question of why watch lists 
require more constraint to begin with. Legal constraints, 
after all, usually exist to make people do things they would 
not otherwise do. And at first glance, there seems to be 
every reason to think that government agencies want to 
make their watch lists work. If that is the case, we can 
assume that agencies will try their hardest to create the 
best and most useful watch lists possible. We would not 
need to tell them how, or to force them to take some 
particular route to getting there.  
As I contend in Part I, however, the incentive structures 
surrounding terrorist watch lists push agents and agencies 
to exaggerate dangers, putting names on watch lists that do 
not belong there. These false positives might be more 
acceptable if they made watch lists more comprehensive, 
reducing the likelihood that the watch list would miss 
someone who ought to be on there—a false negative. But, as 
Part I also shows, watch lists’ perverse incentives lead 
agents and agencies to misconstrue the relationship 
between false positives and false negatives. These perverse 
effects endanger the very national security that watch lists 
are meant to safeguard by discouraging the kind of self-
correction that would make watch lists more effective. 
Part II explains the structure of contemporary terrorist 
watch lists, showing how information and knowledge are 
produced in the watch list context. Contemporary watch 
lists use the techniques of “big data” to collect information 
and distribute the work of evaluation and prediction over 
many participants.8 However, they largely eschew the self-
  
 8. “Big data” broadly refers to the use of unprecedented quantities of data 
for natural- and social-scientific analysis. The hope of big data users is to 
harness large data sets to make interpretations and predictions independently 
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assessment techniques that make the use of big data 
reliably useful. Their distributed knowledge production can 
help watch lists smooth over the peculiarities of individual 
agents. But it can also exacerbate judgment problems by 
stacking peculiarity upon peculiarity and giving the result a 
veneer of objective truth. Explaining how judgment is 
incorporated in watch lists elucidates the errors they are 
prone to and helps clarify why a conflicted incentive 
structure leads to a high false positive rate.  
A high rate of false positives might still be acceptable if 
there were no cost associated with them. And because of 
their objective veneer, watch lists can seem like a costless, 
neutral backdrop of impartial information about the world. 
It seems as though they have no effects on the world 
themselves. Part III argues that this neutral view is wrong. 
As scholars concerned with individual rights have 
recognized, unregulated, error-prone watch lists affect the 
people listed on them in powerful ways. But watch lists also 
affect the agents and agencies that maintain them, lowering 
their efficacy and acumen by failing to provide reality 
checks for their judgments. Further, watch lists skew public 
policy by making terrorism appear to be a more imminent 
and severe threat than it is, which leads resources to be 
diverted from other programs into terrorism-related ones.9 
And to the broader public, watch lists present a world 
populated by terrorist threats that can often be recognized 
with blunt categories like ethnicity and religion. That   
of small variations across populations. The fears of their critics are that big data 
usage techniques focus so much on the control of data itself that they neglect 
testing the accuracy, or the normative implications, of their results. See, e.g., 
Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 1-2 (reporting that 
scientists and businesses have access to vastly more data than ever before and 
explaining that this so-called big data poses unprecedented opportunities for 
uncovering social trends and scientific truths, but also poses new challenges in 
data management and interpretation); Alan Feuer, The Mayor’s Geek Squad, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at MB1; Steve Lohr, Origins of ‘Big Data’: An 
Etymological Detective Story, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2013, 9:10 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/the-origins-of-big-data-an-etymological-
detective-story/ (discussing difficulty of tracing the origin of the term “big data” 
and giving the most likely sources); Press Release, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, Obama Administration 
Unveils “Big Data” Initiative: Announces $200 Million in New R&D 
Investments (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
microsites/ostp/big_data_press_release_final_2.pdf. 
 9. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
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affects how people act in their society and what they see as 
its most urgent problems. Watch lists, in other words, are 
far from costless. They go beyond affecting individual rights 
to affect government functioning and social structure.  
Yet, as Part IV claims, the legal strictures that 
currently regulate database use miss the point. They focus 
on informational accuracy, not predictive efficacy. I suggest 
that this lacuna rests on an outdated understanding of 
contemporary databases as mere repositories for 
independently existing information, not the sites of 
judgment production and prediction they actually are.  
Traditionally, government judgment has been subject to 
legal constraint that can be reviewed in court. The watch 
list context, as I show, complicates this approach by 
introducing secret algorithms of prediction that result in 
little that is cognizable in court. This limitation, I contend, 
should not dissuade us from analyzing and constraining 
watch lists. The absence of judicial review cannot obviate 
scrutiny and constraint of government action in a 
democratic society. Rather, as recent scholarship has 
suggested, we must look to institutional design and internal 
self-regulation to solve those problems that cannot reach 
the courts.10  
Part V proposes regulating watch lists by focusing on 
the increased efficacy that comes with increased constraint. 
My suggestions build on a growing call for government to 
assess, and not only project, the effects of its actions. And 
they stake a claim for Bayesian updating at the center of 
administrative self-regulation—the kind of regulation that 
increasingly looks to be the main way of controlling the 
administrative state.11  
Finally, the Conclusion examines the limitations of my 
proposals and explains why any solution to the watch list 
problem will always be partial. It further discusses how 
similar concerns, and a similar approach, will be 
appropriate to other government databases used to make 
predictions about future human conduct, when their 
incentive structures are similarly conflicted.   
  
 10. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s 
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319-24 (2006). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 2316.  
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I. WHY ARE TERRORIST WATCH LISTS NOT SELF-REGULATING? 
To the extent that terrorist watch lists play a role in 
national security, we would expect the agencies that 
manage them to create strict procedures to ensure their 
efficacy. Given how central national security is to 
contemporary government, the incentives for efficacy should 
be so strong that such lists would not require additional 
regulation. In actuality, however, agencies have not fulfilled 
these expectations. Below, I explain how conflicts in the 
agencies’ incentive structure cause this failure. I also 
explain how mistaken assumptions about the relationship 
between false positives and false negatives in the watch list 
context make the failure to implement internal regulation 
seem less important than it is.  
A. Incentive Failures 
Reports indicate that people are commonly listed in 
terrorist watch lists based on suspicions ranging from the 
constitutionally impermissible to the absurd. For example, 
in 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
detained and refused entry to two British nationals en route 
to Los Angeles because the agency concluded that the 
couple’s Twitter messages suggested they were planning to 
engage in terrorist activity.12 DHS did not credit the 
tourists’ claim that they were joking when they announced 
on Twitter that they planned to “dig up” Marilyn Monroe, 
nor that a tweet about “destroy[ing] America” simply used 
British slang for “party.”13  
In another scenario, reminiscent of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s (FBI’s) notorious CoIntelPro operations,14 
  
 12. See Richard Hartley-Parkinson, ‘I’m Going to Destroy America and Dig 
Up Marilyn Monroe’: British Pair Arrested in U.S. on Terror Charges over 
Twitter Jokes, MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 31, 2012, 8:08 AM) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093796/Emily-Bunting-Leigh-Van-
Bryan-UK-tourists-arrested-destroy-America-Twitter-jokes.html. 
 13. Id. 
 14. The FBI describes its CoIntelPro operations in this way:  
The FBI began COINTELPRO—short for Counterintelligence 
Program—in 1956 to disrupt the activities of the Communist Party of 
the United States. In the 1960s, it was expanded to include a number of 
other domestic groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Socialist Workers 
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the Denver police department “built a computer database 
full of personal details about people” engaging in 
constitutionally protected activity, such as being “active in 
political groups” like “a Quaker peace-advocacy group . . . 
and . . . the pro-gun lobby.”15 Because terrorist watch lists 
often gather records from local law enforcement agencies, 
entries in such databases can lead extensive lives outside 
the local law enforcement agency itself. Although the 
Denver files were expunged after a Freedom of Information 
Act suit made them public, “when a man listed in the 
Denver files as a gun-rights group member got into a fender 
bender, a police officer checking [an FBI terrorist watch list] 
found him described as ‘a member of a terrorist 
organization’ [and] reported the stop to the FBI as a 
‘terrorist contact.’”16 The man’s record, in other words, had 
made its way into the federal terrorist watch list; but its 
subsequent expungement had not. 
Yet more troublingly, agencies that manage watch lists 
have been reluctant to create ways to improve—or even 
evaluate—their efficacy. The Transportation Security 
Administration, for instance, “operated its data-based 
passenger screening programs for more than two years with 
no system in place to report or correct errors,” despite its 
famously high error rate.17 And in recent years, federal 
agencies have increasingly exempted law enforcement and 
national security databases from Privacy Act provisions 
  
Party, and the Black Panther Party. All COINTELPRO operations were 
ended in 1971. Although limited in scope (about two-tenths of one 
percent of the FBI’s workload over a 15-year period), COINTELPRO 
was later rightfully criticized by Congress and the American people for 
abridging first amendment rights and for other reasons. 
See FBI Records: The Vault, FBI: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
 15. Ann Davis, Use of Data Collection Systems Is Up Sharply Following 9/11, 
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2003, at B1. 
 16. Id. As this report indicates, records entered into one law enforcement 
database can take on a life of their own as they are distributed to others, often 
with no provisions for updating the secondary files when the original one 
changes. Id. 
 17. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal 
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 475 (2008).  
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requiring agencies to ensure their records are accurate, 
relevant, timely, and complete.18  
For instance, agencies have exempted a number of 
databases collected by the Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB) from these statutory provisions. And in 2003, the 
FBI exempted the entire National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) database,19 which holds a wealth of 
information, including the names of people the FBI or the 
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) suspect of belonging to 
terrorist groups or planning to engage in terrorist acts.20 
  
 18. The Privacy Act allows certain agencies to exempt some records from 
some of its provisions under certain circumstances. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) 
(2006). 
 19. See Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. 4974 (proposed 
Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.96); Privacy Act of 1974; 
Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,140 (Mar. 24, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 
16.96); see also 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2006) (providing that “[t]he Attorney 
General shall . . . acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal 
identification, crime, and other records”); Interstate Identification Index (III), 
SEARCH http://www.search.org/programs/policy/iii/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) 
(stating that the Interstate Identification Index holds records of convictions as 
well of arrests for felonies and serious misdemeanors). For a description of the 
NCIC, see National Crime Information Center, FBI: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ncic.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  
 20. See Privacy Act of 1974; Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774, 
19,774-75 (Apr. 20, 1995) (issuing a System of Records Notice for the Violent 
Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)); see generally Passport 
Information Sharing with Department of State: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Donna A. 
Bucella, Dir., Terrorist Screening Ctr.) (describing the Terrorist Screening 
Center’s (TSC’s) consolidation of names of known and suspected terrorists into 
the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)); WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 32366, TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION, SCREENING, AND TRACKING UNDER 
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 6, at 31-32 (citing unpaginated 
front matter) (2004) (noting that the NCIC is used to disseminate records from 
the TSC’s TSDB).  
The most plausible reading of the Privacy Act suggests that the VGTOF is 
actually not subject to exemption. The exemption notice states that the 
“exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to 
exemption pursuant to” sections (j)(2) and (k)(3) of 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 28 C.F.R. § 
16.96(g)(1) (2012). Section (j)(2) allows a law enforcement agency to exempt a 
system of records containing 1) “information compiled for the purpose of 
identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged offenders”; 2) “information 
compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation”; or 3) “reports identifiable 
to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the 
criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.” 5 
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Any law enforcement agent in the country can access the 
NCIC. Officers routinely use the NCIC during common 
interactions with the public, such as traffic stops, to check 
whether an individual is listed in its terrorist watch list, 
among other things.  
The notice exempting the NCIC asserted that 
“ensur[ing] compliance with” the Privacy Act’s requirements 
that information be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete 
was “administratively impossible” “because many of these 
records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, 
tribal, and international agencies.”21 It also noted that, 
“[w]ith the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or 
untimely information may acquire new significance as 
further investigation brings new details to light.”22  
As the exemption notice suggests, terrorist watch lists 
create a particularly shaky form of prediction for a number 
  
U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (2006). Under section (k)(3), an agency may exempt records 
maintained for the President’s protective services. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(3) (2006); 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(1) (describing the authorization of the United States 
Secret Service to protect the President). VGTOF records, however, do not 
identify alleged criminal offenders, are compiled separately from criminal 
investigations and enforcement operations, and do not concern the protective 
services. The proffered exemptions thus do not apply to VGTOF files. The 
exemption would be difficult to challenge, however, for standing reasons. See 
discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 21. 28 C.F.R. 16.96(b)(6) (2012). 
 22. Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,140. The notice of 
final rulemaking does not address any public comments and does not mention 
whether any comments were received in response to the notice of proposed 
rulemaking. The contention that seemingly unimportant discrete pieces of 
information must be collected and protected from exposure because they may 
end up fitting together in some important but unpredictable way is sometimes 
called the “mosaic theory.” The mosaic theory posits that, because seemingly 
unimportant discrete pieces of information may end up fitting together in an 
important but unpredictable way, they should be assiduously collected and 
protected from disclosure. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National 
Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 633 (2005). The 
theory has been criticized for encouraging an over inclusion of information, 
overemphasis on secrecy, and general inefficacy. Id. at 632-33. Moreover, while 
the mosaic theory holds that any piece of information may be useful someday, it 
operates in a world of limited resources, where someone must determine which 
pieces of information are worth collecting, keeping, and analyzing. See id. at 
630. Mosaic theory claims thus obscure the decisions that unavoidably go into 
information collection and data processing.  
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of reasons. Human conduct is especially difficult to predict 
in areas with little historical data to draw on.23 Terrorists 
tend to organize themselves in ways that are less structured 
and regular than some other forms of social organization.24 
And it is hard to approach emotionally salient topics with 
the kind of dispassionate attitude that facilitates rational 
projections.25 
These difficulties should lead agencies to impose more, 
not less, oversight on terrorist watch lists. And because the 
Privacy Act does not define accuracy, relevance, timeliness, 
and completeness, the agency could have issued regulations 
interpreting them in the context of the NCIC. Instead, it 
exempted the database from Privacy Act requirements by 
claiming that the database’s weaknesses are unknowable to 
the very agency that maintains it, and that this opaqueness 
itself excuses the agency from setting standards for it. That 
explanation itself, of course, raises the question of why 
  
 23. Jeff Jonas & Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role 
of Predictive Data Mining, 584 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 7-8 (2006). Jonas 
and Harper explain that predictions made through data mining work best when 
based on a wealth of historical information about how people behave under 
various circumstances, but become much less reliable when less historical data 
is available. They emphasize that very little historical data is available on 
terrorists and terrorism. Moreover, focusing merely on unusual behavior cannot 
effectively predict terrorist conduct: “Treating ‘anomalous’ behavior as 
suspicious may appear scientific, but, without patterns to look for, the design of 
a search algorithm based on anomaly is no more likely to turn up terrorists than 
twisting the end of a kaleidoscope is likely to draw an image of the Mona Lisa.” 
Id. at 8.  
 24. Karin Knorr Cetina, Complex Global Microstructures: The New Terrorist 
Societies, 22 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 213, 214 (2005) (suggesting that 
contemporary terrorism manages to extend its reach by “avoid[ing] complex 
institutional structures” that allow a greater measure of prediction; rather, it 
exhibits the “asymmetries, unpredictabilities and playfulness of complex (and 
dispersed) interaction patterns”); see also TODD MASSE, SIOBHAN O’NEIL, AND 
JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33858, THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: EVOLUTION, ISSUES, AND 
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS: SUMMARY (2007), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80208.pdf (noting that risk 
assessment in the national security field is particularly difficult because of “the 
dynamic nature of terrorism” and the absence of specific historical evidence). 
 25. Dan M. Kahan et al., ‘They Saw a Protest’: Cognitive Illiberalism and the 
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 900 (2012) (arguing that 
cultural and emotional commitments lead people to radically different 
interpretations of the same events).  
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every routine interaction between law enforcement agents 
and private individuals should include a check of a watch 
list whose quality and utility is simply not knowable.  
This reluctance to increase efficacy by assessing it 
seems particularly out of place in the national security 
context, where stakes are high. But growing evidence 
indicates that this attitude is not unusual in the national 
security arena. A recent National Research Council study 
found that, while DHS has developed adequate risk analysis 
protocols for addressing natural disasters, it has no risk 
analysis framework for terrorism threats.26 Relatedly, 
researchers have found that DHS rebuffs requests to 
conduct risk or cost-benefit analyses for national security-
related regulations.27 DHS asserts that the dynamic and 
evolving nature of national security risk makes such 
analysis impossible.28 Thus, the department promulgates 
regulations while asserting that it can have no opinion 
about their utility.29 
This trend might not be so worrisome if terrorist watch 
lists were subject to incentives that would assure that 
agencies would strive for the highest level of efficacy even if 
they did not publicize their processes for doing so. 
Unfortunately, that too is not the case. Terrorist watch lists 
may appear to serve a single purpose: to help the 
government prevent terrorist attacks by keeping track of 
suspected terrorists. But like other predictive database 
uses, they actually serve multiple, competing purposes, 
which subject government agents to conflicting pressures.  
Specific goals like preventing terrorism are couched in 
larger obligations like serving the public good and treating 
  
 26. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REVIEW OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S APPROACH TO RISK ANALYSIS 2 (2010). 
 27. JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: 
BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY 5 (2011). 
 28. Id. 
 29. This comports with scholarship finding that political salience affects the 
substance of proposed regulations. See Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, 
The Triumph of Regulatory Politics: Benefit–Cost Analysis and Political 
Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189, 190 (2012) (finding that politically salient 
proposed rules tend to have smaller projected benefits than lower-salience 
rules). 
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people fairly.30 Those larger obligations, in turn, have many 
interpretations. In one familiar juxtaposition, some define 
the public good in terms of community security while others 
focus on individual privacy.31 Still others have other 
definitions. Some may view restraining the government’s 
intervention in society as a public good, while others view 
the government’s role as ensuring fair treatment and safety 
for all. Because what best serves the public good and what 
constitutes fairness are subjects of debate in democratic 
societies, these larger obligations are never finally defined 
or uniform among participants.  
These varied goals, moreover, coexist with other 
motivations. Agents and agencies have performative 
incentives to appear active and efficacious. And they have 
rent-seeking incentives to ensure continued resources and 
attention to their operations. One way of showing that an 
agency that maintains a watch list is active and efficacious 
is to put more names on the list. Agencies that keep watch 
lists may face image problems when they list people who are 
unlikely to fulfill their predictions.32 But they may also 
benefit from listing more people at the expense of accuracy. 
More entries can make the agency look more active in its 
pursuit of the public good, even when they produce no 
actual public benefits down the line.  
  
 30. Program Manager, Info. Sharing Env’t, Information Sharing 
Environment Annual Report to the Congress, National Security Through 
Responsible Information Sharing, at iv (June 30, 2012), 
http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE_Annual_Report_to_Congress_2012.pdf 
(noting that the agency had recently strengthened privacy and civil rights 
safeguards on terrorism related information-sharing).  
 31. See, e.g., John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A Historical 
Perspective of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 285, 
287 (2005) (positing that public sentiment tends to swing toward preferring 
national security following a crisis but returns to “equilibrium . . . as the initial 
threat dissipates”); Shaun B. Spencer, Security vs. Privacy: Reframing the 
Debate, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 519-20 (2002) (arguing that the trade offs 
between national security and privacy are often misrepresented in public 
discourse in ways that mistakenly make pursuing national security seem the 
more rational and more achievable path). 
 32. See, e.g., Mike McIntire, Ensnared by Error on Growing U.S. Watch List, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A1 (detailing two cases in which people who appear 
to pose no national security risk have been denied access to travel in ways that 
severely impinge on their careers, and noting the rapid pace of watch list 
expansion despite the frequent recurrence of such problems).  
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Overlisting also has institutional benefits. A large list of 
terrorist suspects suggests that terrorist activities are 
likely. That, in turn, suggests that more resources should be 
devoted to agencies that deal with terrorism. That cycle can 
encourage rent-seeking in the form of spurious prediction: a 
large watch list makes national security threats seem 
prevalent, which makes the agency’s activities particularly 
necessary, which encourages attention and resources to flow 
to the agency and the watch list.33 That encourages agencies 
to keep false positives—people incorrectly identified as 
terrorist threats—on their watch lists.  
Of course, agents and agencies need not consciously 
decide to increase the number of false positives to bulk up 
watch list numbers. Rather, the rent-seeking opportunities 
may simply discourage agencies from spending the 
resources to develop assessment mechanisms that would 
reduce them. 
B. Relating False Positives to False Negatives 
One approach to terrorist watch lists holds that the 
increased number of false positives is a negligible price to 
pay. Any reduction in missed predictions, or false negatives, 
justifies any number of spurious predictions, or false 
positives. The point of a terrorist suspect database, after all, 
is to prevent terrorist attacks, not to prevent inaccurate 
listing. Inaccuracy, the argument goes, is a fine price to pay 
for the benefit of avoiding an attack, because the cost of 
allowing some very damaging events like terrorist attacks 
to occur will always be higher than the cost of inaccurate 
predictions.34  
  
 33. Cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, 
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 27, 156 (2007). Harcourt argues that the 
practice of profiling leads law enforcement organizations to devote more 
resources to catching crime in the profiled population. See id. at 27. This skews 
public policy by creating a “self-fulfilling prophecy:” more crime is discovered 
within the profiled group because more resources are devoted to uncovering 
crime within it. Id. at 156. 
 34. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 245, 246 (2008); see also RON SUSKIND, THE ONE-PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP 
INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 11-41 (2006) (describing 
this view). An analysis of the financial costs of the No Fly List estimates that 
taxpayers pay in the range of $100 million per year for that watch list alone. 
Marcus Holmes, Just How Much Does that Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the 
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But whether, and when, that is the case is not clear. 
The always-worth-it view assumes a predictable trade-off 
between false positives and false negatives. Because 
including more names on a watch list means casting the net 
wider, having more false positives leads to having fewer 
false negatives. The model for this approach is the medical 
test that correctly recognizes a particular condition but is 
overly sensitive to its indicia. The medical test may 
mistakenly flag many people who have the indicia but do 
not have the condition, but at least it will also flag most 
people who have the condition. Its false positive rate 
assures a low number of false negatives.  
A watch list with a protocol for predicting human 
conduct that effectively targets indicia of that conduct can 
present the trade-off in roughly the same form. But one 
with less carefully designed prediction protocols—or one 
that targets conduct whose indices are difficult to 
determine—may yield a high false positive rate without a 
correspondingly low false negative rate. Its predictions may 
simply be more arbitrary than recognition of symptoms by a 
medical test.  
For instance, the terrorist watch list housed in the 
NCIC, the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File 
(VGTOF), asks agents to predict whether a person is likely 
to commit a terrorist act using a set of criteria developed to 
identify members of violent gangs. The FBI first developed a 
gang list in the early 1990s but expanded the list to include 
“terrorist organizations and members” after incoming 
Director Louis Freeh reevaluated the proposal.35 Despite 
  
Financial Costs and Benefits of the “No-Fly” List, 5 HOMELAND SEC. AFFAIRS 1, 2 
(2009). In this Article, I focus on the nonmonetary costs that watch lists exact. 
 35. Minutes, National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy Board, 
Atlanta, Ga. 52 (Dec. 14-15, 1994) (document obtained through FOIA lawsuit) 
(Bates number NCIC-VGTOF-771) (on file with author). Taking up Director 
Freeh’s suggestion, the Advisory Policy Board decided to “include terrorist 
organizations of an active and violent nature” within the definition of “gang.” Id. 
Based on suggestions from the Department of Justice Criminal Division, this 
plan was revised to provide a freestanding definition for “terrorist organization” 
that was “in line with the definition commonly used by the FBI.” Id. at 53. That 
definition describes terrorism as “activities that . . . involve violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within 
the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State . . . [which] appear to be 
intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
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this new addition, the criteria for listing a terrorist 
remained the same as those for listing a gang member, “as 
[those criteria] apply to members of terrorist 
organizations.”36  
It is not clear, however, that the VGTOF’s gang criteria 
are well suited to pick out terrorist conduct or likely 
terrorists. Specifically, the criteria for inclusion are either 
self-admission as a gang member upon arrest or 
incarceration, or two of the following: (1) identification “as a 
gang member by a reliable informant”; (2) identification “as 
a gang member by an informant whose information has 
been corroborated”; (3) “frequent[ing] a gang’s area, 
associat[ing] with known members, and/or affect[ing] gang 
dress, tattoos, or hand signals”; (4) being “arrested multiple 
times with known gang members for offenses consistent 
with gang activity”; or (5) “[s]elf-admission” as a gang 
member at some point other than upon arrest or 
incarceration.37  
Because the sociological characteristics of terrorist 
organizations differ from those of gangs, however, applying 
these criteria to terrorist suspects is not straightforward. 
The criteria may pick out gang-related conduct, but have 
little apparent relation to terrorist conduct. For instance, 
many American gangs occupy particular territory, often 
striving to control that territory in ways that mimic the 
control of the state.38 But the United States has no   
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of 
a government by [crimes] or kidnapping.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(B) (2006); see 
also National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy Board; Meeting, 58 
Fed. Reg. 27,752, 27,752 (May 11, 1993) (announcing that a “proposal for an 
NCIC Gang File” will be discussed at the Advisory Policy Board meeting to be 
held in June 1993); Notice of Lodging of a Consent Decree Pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 58 
Fed. Reg. 60,212, 60,212 (Nov. 15,1993) (announcing that that the “status of the 
NCIC Gang File” will be discussed at the meeting scheduled for that December). 
 36. See Privacy Act of 1974: Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774, 
19,775 (Apr. 20, 1995) (specifying that the list would include identifying 
information of “[i]ndividuals about whom investigations has [sic] developed 
sufficient information to establish membership in a particular terrorist 
organization using the same criteria listed above [for gangs] as they apply to 
members of terrorist organizations rather than members of violent criminal 
gangs”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. For example, 
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territories controlled by or associated with terrorist 
organizations in this way. Similarly, well-organized 
American gangs are known to often favor certain colors and 
clothes as external indicia of membership. In contrast, 
terrorists in the United States generally strive to remain 
hidden. It is thus unclear what kind of external indicia 
would serve as the terrorist version of gang colors, clothes, 
and signals.  
The VGTOF criteria also give no indication of what 
constitutes a reliable informant or what kind of information 
would corroborate an informant’s claim.39 They do not 
specify who qualifies as a “known” terrorist organization 
member. If being listed in the VGTOF suffices to make 
someone a “known” terrorist, the vagueness of the list’s 
criteria may simply reinforce itself. Moreover, precisely 
because the criteria are imprecise and subjective, one can 
imagine a range of views on what is required to fulfill them.  
Despite these fairly obvious problems, neither the FBI’s 
System of Records Notice nor internal documents produced 
in FOIA litigation have revealed an underlying theory that 
would explain how the VGTOF criteria would effectively 
pick out both gang members and terrorists. For instance, in 
2002, “the military and other agencies” started 
“fingerprinting the detainees in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
  
[B]y laying claim to certain ‘turf’ (i.e., by symbolically appropriating 
spaces, policing areas, and monitoring the behaviors of strangers) and 
offering services such as protection for residents, the gang effectively 
imposes onto [a] formal space a symbolic map that residents of the 
neighborhood are aware of and use to guide their own travels. 
Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social Organization of Street Gang Activity in an 
Urban Ghetto, 103 AM. J. OF SOC. 82, 90-91 (1997). Venkatesh goes on to explain 
how individuals’ movement through the area and through the city can be 
affected by the dominance of a gang in their neighborhood. Someone “visiting a 
friend” in another neighborhood “may minimize travel through those areas 
controlled by gangs that are at war with the one in his or her own 
neighborhood,” and even a non-gang member visiting a loved one in an area or 
building controlled by a gang hostile to the one dominant in his neighborhood 
might need a special dispensation to be allowed to enter the building. Id. at 105. 
Some residents cease patronizing retail establishments and even social service 
providers in neighborhoods considered risky to travel to or enter because of gang 
affiliation. See id. at 106. 
 39. See TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S 
MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 16-17 (2013) (arguing that many FBI 
informants have no reliable access to information on terrorism). 
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Cuba, and other places with those being sent to [the FBI] to 
. . . populate the [VGTOF].”40 As is well known, however, the 
quality of American detention practices in the military 
operations following the 9/11 attacks left much to be 
desired: many detainees were victims of local political 
conflicts or false information, while others were in a sense 
sold for the high bounties offered by American forces.41 
  
 40. Minutes, Criminal Justice Information Services, Advisory Policy Board, 
Chicago, Ill. 7 (June 5-6, 2002) (Bates number NCIC-VGTOF-4269) (on file with 
author) (providing notes on speech by Michael Kirkpatrick, Assistant Dir. in 
Charge of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Info. Servs. (CJIS) Division) (document 
obtained through FOIA lawsuit). Publicly available records do not indicate 
which two criteria such suspects fulfilled. It may well be that all of Afghanistan, 
for instance, was considered a terrorist organization “area,” or that detainees 
were simply treated as presumptive terrorist suspects by virtue of being 
detained—despite the many known problems with identifying actual threats in 
areas of United States military activity. 
 41. See, e.g., Ramzi Kassem, From Altruists to Outlaws: The Criminalization 
of Traveling Islamic Volunteers, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 89 (2010–
2011) (“Bounty leaflets were designed by various U.S. national security agencies 
and intelligence services and disseminated in Afghanistan after the invasion 
that followed the 9/11 attacks. . . . Many of the men who, like my clients, ended 
up in the U.S. military prisons at Bagram, Kandahar and Guantanamo were 
turned over for bounties similar to the ones offered in these leaflets, ranging 
from five to sometimes twenty thousand dollars, large amounts of money 
anywhere in the world but especially in countries with less affluent populations 
such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.”) (citations omitted); Stuart Taylor, Jr., 
Falsehoods About Guantanamo, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 13-14 (reporting on a 
study that found that the best evidence suggests that fewer than 20% of 
Guantanamo detainees had been al-Qaeda members, that many were not 
members of the Taliban, and that most were handed over to United States 
forces by “reward-seeking Pakistanis and Afghan warlords and by villagers of 
highly doubtful reliability”); Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo 
Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense 
Data, 2 (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf 
(finding that Defense Department data show that 55% of Guantanamo 
detainees had not been shown to have committed any acts hostile to the United 
States; that only 8% had been classified by the Defense Department as al-Qaeda 
members; that many had been detained based on very loose associations with 
groups that were not classified as terrorist organizations by the Department of 
Homeland Security; that most Guantanamo detainees had been handed over to 
United States forces by Pakistanis or Afghans at a time when the United States 
offered large bounties for suspected enemies); Tom Lasseter, Day 1: America’s 
Prison for Terrorists Often Held the Wrong Men, MCCLATCHY (June 15, 2008), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/06/15/38773/day-1-americas-prison-for-
terrorists.html (reporting on a McClatchy investigation finding that dozens, and 
quite likely hundreds, of United States detainees in the War on Terrorism were 
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Without some empirical testing, we cannot know whether 
listing Afghan peasants who had run-ins with their 
neighbors or were turned over for the bounty also increased 
the chances that people who actually harbored terrorist 
intent would be listed as well.  
Given all this, there is little reason to think that netting 
more false positives in the VGTOF will substantially reduce 
the number of false negatives. Because the VGTOF’s 
criteria do not reliably pick out terrorist conduct or 
terrorists, the relationship between false positives and false 
negatives on the list will be much more arbitrary than that 
in a medical test that is overly sensitive to the symptoms of 
a disease. Without knowing the predictive protocol of a 
particular watch list, and without testing its efficacy, we 
simply cannot know how its false positive rate relates to its 
false negative rate. 
Moreover, even in stark and highly salient areas like 
national security, it is not clear that the costs of any false 
negative will be high. Watch lists, after all, target 
potentialities. Given the practical difficulties of launching a 
terrorist attack, a person who is incorrectly identified as 
innocuous, despite having the propensity to commit a 
violent act, is still quite likely never to do so.42 We cannot 
decide whether avoiding a false negative is worth some 
number of false positives without knowing more about both 
the likelihood of harm and its likely severity.  
The always-worth-it view also ascribes astronomical 
costs to any false negative, and essentially zero costs to 
false positives. But false positives are not costless. For one 
thing, they decrease watch list efficacy because large 
numbers of irrelevant entries make it more difficult for 
users to distinguish signal from noise. Agents have a harder 
time identifying relevant, useful information that 
appropriately motivates action. It is well known, for 
instance, that government agencies had plenty of 
  
“wrongfully imprisoned . . . on the basis of flimsy or fabricated evidence, old 
personal scores or bounty payments”).  
 42. See, e.g., AARONSON, supra note 39, at 19-34 (detailing the complexities of 
terrorist attacks and arguing that most terrorist plots in the United States since 
2001 are creations of the FBI, because most people prosecuted for terrorist acts 
would not have been capable of planning or carrying out an attack themselves 
but depended to a large extent on conceptual, logistical, and financial assistance 
from the FBI through its confidential informants).  
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information indicating that the man who turned out to be 
the Christmas Day bomber likely posed a danger, yet he 
was allowed to board a plane.43 The failure to spot and stop 
him earlier can be described as a failure of attention to 
relevant information. That information was lost in the mass 
of irrelevant information surrounding it.  
More data also makes a database more difficult to 
maintain and increases data integrity, collection, 
maintenance, and protection problems. For instance, a 
Department of Defense (DOD) feasibility investigation 
recently concluded that creating a database of all 
Congressional Medal of Honor recipients—purely factual 
information in the government’s sole possession—would 
impose such a serious administrative burden that it was 
“impracticable.”44 Maintaining information sufficient to 
predict human conduct, as watch lists do, clearly involves 
more data and difficulty than this purely factual 
compilation. If that easier task is impracticable, 
proliferating data on watch lists clearly poses a great 
challenge.  
The agents and agencies that maintain watch lists work 
within a web of complex and often conflicting incentives. 
Because the predictive work that watch lists do is 
inherently uncertain and often difficult to test, direct 
incentives to individuals are difficult to design. Some 
scholars have proposed offering monetary rewards for good 
decisions in the administrative context.45 But it is difficult to   
 43. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, SUMMARY OF THE WHITE 
HOUSE REVIEW OF THE DECEMBER 25, 2009 ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK, 2 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/white-house-review-
summary-regarding-12252009-attempted-terrorist-attack (concluding that the 
intelligence community had sufficient information to know that Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab posed a danger but failed to “connect the dots”); Jeff Zeleny & 
Helene Cooper, Obama: ‘We Are at War’, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Jan. 7, 2010, 
4:53 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/obama-review-
revealed-significant-national-security-shortcomings/.  
 44. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (quoting “Brief for 
United States” at 55) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Paying Bank Examiners 
for Performance: Should Regulators Receive Bonuses for Effectively Guarding the 
Public Interest?, 35 REG. 32, 32 (2012) (arguing that monetary bonuses linked to 
the value of regulated banks and timing of regulatory decisions would improve 
bank regulator performance by giving regulators a direct stake in the monetary 
value of their decisions). 
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implement a reward system in the absence of any 
mechanism for assessing judgment. Moreover, because 
watch list agents’ subjective intuitions are constrained by 
watch list criteria and protocols, individualized incentives 
would put the burden on the wrong party. Where the agency 
has no way to test and update its predictive protocols, 
rewarding individual agents constrained by them will have 
only a small, and likely an arbitrary, effect.  
Addressing agencies’ perverse incentives and revising 
their assumptions about how false positives relate to false 
negatives, then, requires systemic regulation, not just 
individual rewards. Below, I propose requiring agencies to 
define what constitutes a false positive and a false negative, 
determine what levels of false positives and false negatives 
are acceptable, and assess and revise watch lists and their 
predictive protocols. To ground my proposals, I first 
introduce how watch lists work, emphasizing the key 
characteristics that differentiate them from other forms of 
knowledge and suspicion. I then describe the social and 
political effects that make them costly. Finally, I explain 
why current law does not suffice to constrain them.  
II. WATCH LIST JUDGMENTS 
In the dictionary and in the law, a database like a 
watch list is just an information repository.46 In this view, 
the information in a database preexists its compilation. My 
bank account number, travel history, and marital status are 
facts just the same, whether they find their way to a 
database or not. But watch lists exceed this simple 
description. They not only compile independently existing 
  
 46. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a database as a “structured set of 
data held in computer storage and typically accessed or manipulated by means 
of specialized software,” while Merriam-Webster defines it as “a usually large 
collection of data organized especially for rapid search and retrieval (as by a 
computer).” See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
47411?redirectedFrom=database#eid (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/database 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2013). The Privacy Act instead uses the term “system of 
records,” defined as a “group of any records . . . from which information is 
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some . . . other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2006). 
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information; they also contain predictions about how 
individuals will conduct themselves in the future.47  
A. Combinability, Portability, Decontextualization,  
Impersonality 
The information in watch lists is easily combinable, 
highly portable, relatively decontextualized, and largely 
impersonal. These things are in themselves not new: we 
have always been able to merge pieces of information, 
transfer information to new addressees, and scrub 
information of specificity. Still, networked information 
storage has made it easier for information in one database 
to be shared with new users, put to new uses, and combined 
with information from other sources. The amount of 
information that a modern database can hold and the ease 
with which that information can be transferred, 
manipulated, and combined is unprecedented—so much so 
that a difference in degree becomes indistinguishable from a 
difference in kind.   
Increasing information collection and networking has 
gone along with forms of information input that enable easy 
combination. Narrative descriptions give way to 
predetermined information categories that can be 
harmonized across databases.48 Networked databases with 
specific input fields can be combined with one another to 
yield ever more diverse information about individuals. Such 
  
 47. Bernard Cohn’s classic study of British colonial knowledge production in 
India introduces the concept of an “investigative modalit[y]” to capture the 
activities that governments undertake to “classify, categorize, and bound the 
vast social world” they seek to control. See BERNARD S. COHN, COLONIALISM AND 
ITS FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE BRITISH IN INDIA 5 (1996). “An investigative 
modality includes the definition of a body of information that is needed, the 
procedures by which appropriate knowledge is gathered, its ordering and 
classification, and then how it is transformed into usable forms such as 
published reports” and other evaluative conclusions. Id. Cohn’s insights, 
developed to study colonialism, are broadly applicable to governments generally. 
Watch lists can be conceived as an investigative modality of the future. 
 48. See, e.g., Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, The Policing of Risk, in 
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 239 
(Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing, as an example, how 
Canadian police reports evolved from free-form narrative entries to forms with 
multiple fields requiring specific information, sometimes chosen from a limited 
range of choices).  
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combinations can also reveal previously unnoticed relations, 
similarities, and patterns through various processes loosely 
labeled “data mining.”49 
The same characteristics that make information easy to 
combine make it portable: easily distributed and understood 
beyond the circle of those who compiled or created it.50 
Combinability expands the scope of what information can 
reveal. Portability expands its audience—who it reveals 
things to. By making information accessible to potentially 
limitless addressees, networked databases like watch lists 
expand the uses to which information can be put and the 
situations in which it can be used: the packaging affects the 
product.  
The information held in contemporary watch lists is 
relatively decontextualized, that is, easily removed from the 
conditions of its production. Users need not know much 
about the person at issue, the government agents who 
entered the information, how the criteria were developed, or 
how the information was compiled to be able to interpret a 
database’s contents.51 Decontextualization allows a database   
 49. Data mining can be defined as “the process of searching data for 
previously unknown patterns and using those patterns to predict future 
outcomes.” Jonas & Harper, supra note 23, at 1. Jonas and Harper describe data 
mining as “a subset of the broader practice of data analysis,” but note that 
“discussions of data mining have probably been hampered by lack of clarity 
about its meaning.” Id. at 5.  
 50. See Paul Kockelman & Anya Bernstein, Semiotic Technologies, Temporal 
Reckoning, and the Portability of Meaning. Or: Modern Modes of Temporality—
Just How Abstract Are They?, 12 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 320, 321 (2012) 
(defining portability as “a way of characterizing the degree to which” a way of 
producing meaning is or appears “widely applicable and/or contextually 
independent”).  
 51. Decontextualization allows anyone familiar with the applicable symbolic 
system to understand information. It has been contrasted in a number of 
different realms of knowledge to information that requires more mutual 
knowledge, personal experience, or situation-specific understandings to be 
successfully understood. Indeed, that contrast has been seen as a central 
tension in modern knowledge-production. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CASEY, THE FATE 
OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY (1997) (discussing place and space); Martin 
Heidegger, Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, in MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER: BASIC WRITINGS 305 (David Farrell Krell ed., 1993) (discussing 
modern science generally); Peter Galison, Ten Problems in History and 
Philosophy of Science, 99 ISIS 111, 119-22 (2008) (providing studies of scientific 
knowledge production). In that sense, terrorist watch lists partake of a larger 
trend of modern knowledge-production and its critique. 
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to look like a world unto itself: the information it contains 
appears independent of the world it describes.52  
Similarly, watch list information appears impersonal 
because the way it is compiled and transmitted obscures its 
dependence on subjective judgment. Standardized forms 
calling for particular information and evaluative criteria 
presented as checklists give an objective feel to database 
information. Determining what criteria should underlie a 
prediction and whether a set of facts fit those criteria are 
themselves subjective, evaluative processes. But the 
personal judgment inherent in these determinations is 
masked by the impersonality of how databases collect and 
transmit them.  
The combinable, portable, decontextualized, and 
seemingly impersonal information in a watch list is used to 
predict whether someone will likely commit a terrorist act 
in the future. Sometimes, that judgment comes from an 
individual agent’s predictions about someone’s conduct. 
Others offer predictions through automated processes based 
on algorithms that evaluate current behavior to predict 
future conduct. Those databases move subjective judgment 
from the direct evaluation of an individual by a person who 
makes a prediction to group evaluations made by those who 
develop the algorithm.  
But in both cases, watch lists inscribe a governmentally 
authorized judgment about an individual. Unlike most 
forms of government judgment, though, they are subject to 
few legal constraints—as the novelty of granting standing to 
No Fly List plaintiffs indicates. Databases used in this way 
do more than simply compile information. They also create 
it. 
  
 52. Studies of language use link decontextualization of communicative signs 
with their entextualization elsewhere. Entextualization has been described as a 
“process of rendering discourse extractable, of making a stretch of linguistic 
production into a unit—a text—that can be lifted out of its interactional setting.” 
Richard Bauman & Charles L. Briggs, Poetics and Performance as Critical 
Perspectives on Language and Social Life, 19 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 59, 73 
(1990). In this sense, a database prediction is “self-entextualiz[ing]”; it appears 
as a “formally autonomous totality” divorced from the communicators who 
created it. Michael Silverstein, “Cultural” Concepts and the Language-Culture 
Nexus, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 621, 626 (2004). 
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B. The Division of Evaluative Labor 
Predictions made as part of database creation allow for 
a division of evaluative labor among numerous participants. 
Different people set the predictive criteria, make the 
prediction, validate it, and use it. For instance, the criteria 
for determining whether someone is likely to engage in a 
terrorist act comes from one division of the FBI.53 Field 
agents then apply those criteria in individual cases, 
entering predictions that they submit to another agency 
division, which affirms the prediction based on field agents’ 
entries.54  
When nominating an individual who is not the subject 
of an ongoing FBI investigation for inclusion in the 
consolidated terrorist watch list, for instance, an FBI field 
officer submits the recommendation to an FBI 
Headquarters unit charged with reviewing the underlying 
information to determine whether it warrants passing on to 
the National Counterterrorism Center for inclusion.55 Those 
predictions are then made available to all law enforcement 
agents in the country to guide their interactions with listed 
individuals.56  
  
 53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; KROUSE, supra note 20, at 31-
32; see, e.g., Minutes, National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy 
Board, Atlanta, Ga., supra note 35, at 52 (recounting how the Violent Gang and 
Terrorist Organization File, an FBI gang and terrorist watch list, was developed 
by FBI working groups reviewing a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
proposal for a gang list); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 09-25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES, at viii (May 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf 
[hereinafter TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES]; see generally 
Privacy Act of 1974; Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774, 19,774 
(Apr. 20, 1995) (issuing a System of Records Notice for the VGTOF). 
 54. See TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES, supra note 53, at viii. 
 55. Id. at vii-viii. For nominations involving people who are subjects of FBI 
investigations, the intermediate review consists only of ascertaining that the 
documentation is complete and error-free. Id. For international terrorist suspect 
nominations, FBI headquarters first forwards the name on to the NCTC, 
whence it goes to the TSC. Id. An Inspector General report found that the 
mandated internal review was often not completed and that the “internal 
controls over these . . . processes are weak or nonexistent.” Id. at xviii-xix. 
 56. See The National Crime Information Center, supra note 19. 
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The people who interact with the individuals listed in 
the database are, thus, far removed from the people who 
determined that the individuals should be listed in it. In the 
case of the VGTOF, for instance, officers who interact with 
suspects on the ground receive no information as to why a 
suspect ended up on the watch list: in 2009, the agency 
decided that the reasons a name was added to the list 
should not appear in the file.57 Those who apply criteria to 
make predictions about listed individuals are, in turn, 
removed from those who decided what the criteria should 
be.  
III. THE BROAD EFFECTS OF TERRORIST WATCH LISTS 
Watch lists’ combinability, portability, 
decontextualization, and impersonality, as well as their 
diffusion of evaluative labor, help differentiate them from 
other forms of knowledge production like individual, 
interpersonal determinations. These characteristics lend 
predictive government databases of all sorts both strengths 
and weaknesses. And they lead to broad individual, 
political, and social effects that are largely invisible when 
we think of watch lists as mere information repositories. 
This Part explores those larger effects, which comprise the 
hidden costs that watch lists exact.  
A. Effects on Agents and Agencies: Overconfidence and 
Skill Atrophy 
The diffusion of evaluative labor in watch lists leads to 
cumulative judgments that are produced by many 
individual participants at different stages of the predictive 
process. Like many database characteristics, cumulative 
judgment has both an upside and a downside.  
By aggregating individual evaluations and judgments, 
accumulation can erase psychological peculiarities such as 
biases or other weaknesses in reasoning. Psychological 
research has recently tested experimentally what 
anthropology and sociology have always known: our 
evaluations of facts and people depend on our cultural 
  
 57. Minutes, CJIS Advisory Policy Board, National Harbor, Md. 24 (June 4-5, 
2009) (document produced in FOIA litigation) (Bates No. NCIC-VGTOF-6100) 
(on file with author). 
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milieus.58 World views, social connections, emotions, beliefs, 
and personal experiences affect people’s judgments.59 Doling 
out different parts of evaluation to different people may 
ameliorate some of these idiosyncratic psychological 
influences by diversifying the cultural milieus in play. And 
automating parts of the process may make it easier to spot 
the effects of cultural predispositions when they conflict 
with realistic assessments. 
Moreover, removing evaluators from the uses of their 
evaluations may minimize some psychological impediments 
to improving database predictions. Experiments have 
repeatedly demonstrated that people tend to interpret new 
facts to accord with their existing convictions rather than 
allowing evidence that conflicts with their world view to 
alter it.60 Because of this common phenomenon, people who 
make predictions may be averse to finding out whether they 
were right. Perhaps more importantly, they resist acting on 
evidence that they were wrong.61 Separating those who 
make predictions from those who guide the criteria 
underlying predictions may alleviate some of those 
psychological obstacles. Those who devise criteria could 
learn from the mistakes of those who implement them 
rather than from their own mistakes. 
At the same time, cumulative judgment can also 
undermine the efficacy of watch list predictions. Watch lists’ 
  
 58. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
115, 119-21 (2007). 
 59. See, e.g., id.  
 60. See, e.g., id. at 121 (citing Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior 
Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993)) (“Real-world people tend to be anti-Bayesians: 
rather than update their prior beliefs based on new information, they tend to 
evaluate the persuasiveness of new information based on its conformity to their 
experience.”). 
 61. Daniel Kahneman, a pioneer in the study of such irrationalities, has 
written about his own anti-Bayesian experience in the Israeli army, where he 
was on a team that assessed the leadership potential of army recruits. Feedback 
sessions regularly revealed that the team’s “ability to predict performance . . . 
was negligible,” but this “had no effects whatsoever on how we evaluated 
candidates and very little effect on the confidence we felt in our judgments and 
predictions . . . .” DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 209-11 (2011). 
Kahneman’s subsequent research has shown that this “illusion of validity” is 
prevalent among those who make predictions. Id. at 211. 
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depersonalized nature gives them a veneer of objectivity 
that obscures the subjective, evaluative aspects of 
predicting individual conduct. The notion of objectivity has 
long teetered between indicating that a conclusion is true, 
on the one hand, and indicating that it is untainted by 
emotion or personal interest, on the other.62 As historian of 
science Theodore Porter has pointed out, “[o]bjectivity as 
impersonality is often conflated with objectivity as truth.”63 
The lack of an explicit subjectivity in database predictions—
the absence of a visible person evaluating data and making 
predictions in a way that other participants can assess—
contributes to the appearance of objectivity and encourages 
the conflation of impersonality with truth value.64  
In other words, diffusion may ameliorate the effects of 
individual psychology by cancelling out biases, but it may 
also exacerbate them by obscuring individuality. Worse, it 
may lead to cumulative judgments that stack bias on bias. If 
people at different stages of the evaluative process share a 
world view and a cultural milieu, their agreement on a 
prediction can make it seem more reliable even when their 
evaluation merely compounds their individual prejudices or 
predispositions through ideological amplification.65  
  
 62. See, e.g., Lorraine Daston, Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective, 22 
SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 597, 597 (1992) (tracing the historical development of three 
conceptions of objectivity: “ontological objectivity,” the pursuit of truth that 
revolves around “the fit between theory and the world”; “mechanical objectivity,” 
the attempt to “suppress[] the universal human propensity to judge and 
aestheticize” by “forbid[ding] interpretation in reporting and picturing scientific 
results”; and “aperspectival objectivity,” a related form that attempts to 
“eliminat[e] individual (or occasionally group) idiosyncrasies” by combining 
multiple approaches); Theodore M. Porter, Quantification and the Accounting 
Ideal in Science, 22 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 633, 646 (1992) (arguing that the notion 
of objectivity, though sometimes equated simply with truth, is better understood 
as an ideal of “impersonality, standardization” that “reduc[es] subjectivity to a 
minimum”). 
 63. THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN 
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 74 (1995). Porter argues that American public policy 
has historically been characterized by a tension between rhetorics of objectivity 
and the deployment of expertise. American government institutions have turned 
to “mechanical objectivity,” a devotion to rule-based analysis, when their 
expertise was under attack. See id. at 4, 194. 
 64. See id. at 74. 
 65. See, e.g., David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Reid Hastie, What 
Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 917 (2007) (reporting 
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Moreover, the trend of federal agencies exempting 
watch lists from Privacy Act requirements and eschewing 
cost-benefit analysis for national security-related 
regulations, discussed above, suggests that even when 
evaluative labor is diffuse—and the psychological cost of 
being wrong is thus lowered—government actors often 
remain loath to assess their own predictive practices. 
The diffusion of evaluative labor also helps 
decontextualize judgment. Judgment becomes “black 
box[ed],” looking ever less like evaluation and ever more 
like fact.66 Involving computers in watch list predictions 
further intensifies black boxing: automation can obscure the 
very existence of decisions. In fact, however, automated 
evaluation is no less evaluative. Combining data from 
different sources, after all, requires some person to decide 
what kind of data to combine. And deriving knowledge from 
that combination requires someone to draw conclusions 
about its relevance and reliability. Data mining may reveal 
a pattern, in other words, but merely revealing a pattern is 
not enough. It still takes a person to determine whether 
that pattern is relevant to the problem that the watch list 
addresses.  
In the networked world of watch lists, it is easy to treat 
information processing and combination as something 
computers, not people, do. Combining information from 
multiple databases to yield predictions is often seen, in Orin 
Kerr’s words, as simply “data manipulation by a machine.”67   
experimental results showing that deliberations among groups of like-minded 
individuals led participants to take more extreme positions in a process of 
“ideological amplification”); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why 
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 118 (2000) (“[G]roup discussion is 
likely to shift judgments toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated 
by the median of predeliberation judgments.”). 
 66. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND 
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 2-3 (1987) (“The word black box is used by 
cyberneticians whenever a piece of machinery or a set of commands is too 
complex. In its place they draw a little box about which they need to know 
nothing but its input and output.”); see also id. at 253 (“The more . . . complex 
[machines] are, the more . . . each part hides the other as they become darker 
and darker black boxes.”).  
 67. See Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, 11 
BROOKINGS INST.: THE FUTURE OF THE CONST. SERIES 1, 4 (2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/19%20surveillan
ce%20laws%20kerr/0419_surveillance_law_kerr.pdf. 
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But that presents a somewhat idealized description of how 
information is processed. Machines do the aggregation, but 
people have to determine what to aggregate and how to 
aggregate it. People write the algorithms that machines 
perform and interpret the significance of any results. As 
Kerr’s description shows, however, the role of people and 
their subjective judgments in these processes can be 
obscured by the higher visibility of machines and their 
seeming objectivity.68   
The diffusion of evaluative labor also makes a 
database’s predictions harder for any given participant to 
assess. Those who give predictions do not generally know 
how the criteria they apply were created and have no way of 
assessing whether those criteria effectively pick out the 
targeted conduct. Other participants similarly cannot assess 
the strengths of the predictions themselves. The separation 
of functions, of course, inheres in any organizational effort—
division of labor has been recognized as a key aspect of 
complex institutions at least since Adam Smith. The 
inability of any participant to evaluate the overall effects of 
the predictive process is thus not surprising. It does, 
however, make it all the more important for organizations 
to have some means of assessing their predictive database 
uses.  
The diffusion of evaluative labor can thus facilitate self-
correction in some cases while facilitating its avoidance in 
others. It may be that certain areas are so emotionally 
laden and psychologically salient that diffusing evaluative 
labor does not suffice to ameliorate the psychological costs 
of being wrong.69 It may also be that the politics 
surrounding high-salience areas makes self-assessment 
more difficult because it requires admitting our limited 
ability to protect against risk, and it introduces balancing 
requirements into areas that seem so urgent that balancing 
seems inappropriate. 
For instance, when prediction depends heavily on 
agents’ evaluations but appears to rest on objective criteria, 
  
 68. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327 (2004) (noting that “a popular politics that . . . has tilted 
decisively toward harsh punitivism” has made introducing cost-benefit concepts 
into criminal law particularly difficult). 
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agents may come to misrecognize their own judgments as 
simple recognitions of fact. Over time, as agents accumulate 
more of these recognitions of fact, they may become prone to 
over-trusting their own judgments. With no external way to 
test whether their intuitions are correct, and no internal 
requirement to justify their conclusions, agents may come to 
feel that their evaluations are simply correct. But without 
any evaluation of their evaluations, we cannot know that 
they are.  
Over time, this process will lead predictably to lowered 
standards of judgment: agents will feel increasingly 
justified acting on hunches or intuitions rather than 
requiring themselves to work through difficult, 
indeterminate reasoning processes that subject their own 
conclusions to doubt. The watch list they create will act as 
confirmation of their correct evaluation that an individual 
should be on the list. As long as every instance of judgment 
receives a positive response, judgment will appear very 
similar to fact.70 
The evaluative processes that watch lists employ 
themselves form a part of their cultural milieu: they frame 
certain kinds of action as having predictive value, and they 
encourage different levels of self-reflection, self-doubt, and 
self-correction. How evaluation is structured in a database 
thus affects the assessment capabilities of the evaluators. If 
agents are never exposed to their mistakes or forced to 
reassess their instincts, they will make predictions under 
the illusion that they are generally correct. Moreover, feeble 
limits on false positives encourage agents not to examine 
the underlying premises of their decisions. That is, they 
encourage agents to have bad judgment. 
The costs that the atrophy of judgment exact are tricky 
to calculate. While it seems clear that an unrealistic 
  
 70. A similar danger faces any agent with judgment responsibilities, of 
course. But the dangers seem to be starkest in high-salience areas like national 
security. For instance, a Senate report found that after an intelligence agent 
issued a report duplicating information available in major news outlets, a 
“performance review . . . cited this report as a signature accomplishment.” S. 
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND 
LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 41 (Comm. Print 2012), available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/446657/fusion-centers.pdf. Praising 
people for imagining that public information constitutes an intelligence scoop 
seems unlikely to move them to improve their intelligence gathering abilities.  
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predisposition can damage an agent’s ability to make 
accurate assessments, it is difficult to put a dollar value on 
that damage. And while it also seems clear that overvaluing 
the danger posed by terrorism can lead to a skewed 
distribution of government resources, it is hard to know just 
how much money or energy is misspent without knowing 
exactly how overvalued the dangers are.  
B. Effects on Governments: Simplification and Blinding 
Leaving watch lists unregulated not only lowers their 
efficacy. It also gives them undesirable power over the 
course of policy. As a seemingly neutral representation of 
reality, such predictions influence policymakers’ views of 
their government’s most urgent tasks. That influence can 
skew policy toward, or away from, particular problems by 
making the problems appear bigger or smaller.  
Studies of government knowledge production related to 
complex, multicausal, dynamic processes have revealed that 
certain characteristics and problems typify them. Drawing 
on a range of work in social science and history, for 
instance, James Scott has examined how states engaged in 
a number of different projects have tried to take stock of, 
and control over, nature and society.71 An underlying 
feature of such projects, Scott posits, is their reliance on 
“simplifications” that attribute particular importance to a 
few traits.72 Those few traits come to define the entire object 
that the government seeks to control. Simplified 
descriptions make certain characteristics more salient and 
direct policy attention to them. In a sense, they reshape 
reality to make it more amenable to further, equally 
simplified, description. 
Simplification makes labeling and tracking members of 
the relevant category easier. But it also inevitably ignores 
other attributes that may become important in their own 
right. Simplification also has its own recursive effect: it 
makes certain characteristics more salient, thereby 
  
 71. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO 
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2-4 (1998). The book discusses, for 
instance, the failures of collectivization in the Soviet Union, see id. at 193-222, 
compulsory settlement into villages in Tanzia, see id. at 223-61, and the attempt 
to order and plan forest growth in Germany, see id. at 281. 
 72. See id. at 81-82. 
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directing ever more attention to them. But it inevitably 
leaves out important characteristics of reality as well—
characteristics that may not be relevant to some particular 
project, but that do not disappear simply because they are 
ignored. Government observation techniques similarly 
render people and entities more amenable to observation 
and control by emphasizing characteristics that are 
recognizable by those techniques.73  
For Scott and others working in this vein, 
simplification, or attention to discrete characteristics, is not 
harmful in itself. Indeed, any representation of reality must 
reduce reality to some extent. Problems arise, rather, when 
governments take their own simplifications too seriously—
when they refuse to acknowledge the simplifying 
relationship between the real and the represented.74 As 
Andreas Glaeser has written, this is one of the “paradoxes 
of rational planning”: planning depends on the “reification 
of particular representations,” but reification itself 
“obfuscates the knowledge that representations are . . . 
operating in a realm different from what they represent,” 
that is, that reality remains more complex and dynamic 
than its representation reveals.75  
Giving too much credence to the representation thus 
impedes people’s ability to grasp the more complex reality 
underlying it. A partial image not only stands in for the 
larger whole but also obscures the existence of that larger 
whole.76 When states take their own simplifications too 
seriously, they forget that their categories are only 
provisional schema that highlight particular aspects of 
nature or society for particular purposes. They mistake 
their own simplifications for complete descriptions.  
This misunderstanding is self-destructive: the state, 
fooled by its own seemingly perfect descriptions, is at the 
  
 73. See id. at 80-82. 
 74. See id. at 80.  
 75. Andreas Glaeser, Monolithic Intentionality, Belonging, and the 
Production of State Paranoia: A View Through Stasi onto the Late GDR, in OFF 
STAGE / ON DISPLAY: INTIMACY AND ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE AGE OF PUBLIC CULTURE 
244, 245 (Andrew Shryock ed., 2004). 
 76. Id. (arguing that the representation becomes a kind of “fetish” through 
which “an aspectual translation is identified with the totality while knowledge 
of an underlying plurality is repressed”). 
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mercy of all the unexpected, unexplored facts that it failed 
to take into account. And if the state has not built flexibility 
or correction into the system, it is powerless to modify its 
approach or react to unforeseen circumstances. 
Of course, acknowledging a system’s limitations from 
within the system is never easy. Timothy Mitchell’s account 
of the natural and social problems that followed the 
building of the Aswan Dam, for instance, demonstrates the 
complexity involved: looking backward to explain how the 
dam project got started and how it affected its environment, 
his account connects everything from changing class 
relations in Egypt to the development of fertilizer out of 
munitions production, to the natural habitat of the 
mosquito, showing how each factor, and many others, 
played a small role in big events.77 Mitchell argues that it 
was a lack of attention to the inherently multicausal nature 
of sociopolitical events—the illusion of complete knowledge 
to the exclusion of local practices that did not fit into the 
modernist paradigm of social and natural control—that led 
to the dam’s problems.78 
To see like a state, then, is to be a little bit blinded. The 
blinders are self-imposed: made of an eagerness to assume 
and a failure to doubt. We can always hope that acquiring 
more information will smooth out these obstacles through 
the law of large numbers. In the information age, it is 
inviting to assume that the mere availability of information 
itself provides the answers to difficult questions. But we 
cannot free ourselves so easily from reliance on judgment.79 
  
 77. TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, 
MODERNITY 19-53 (2002).  
 78. Mitchell applies to the study of economics and politics the detail-oriented, 
interactional approach of Actor Network Theory, pioneered by Bruno Latour, 
which asks how the multiple factors that contribute to any phenomenon are 
interconnected into coherence. See id.; see also BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING 
THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY 1, 9-11, 21-25 (2007) 
(discussing Actor Network Theory). 
 79. The best known version of this understanding—that technical expertise 
cannot substitute for evaluation, and is to some extent dependent on it—was 
probably Weber’s juxtaposition of formal rationality and value rationality. See 
ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL AND 
MORAL THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 4 (1984) (“[W]hat is rational from one point of 
view may be non-rational or irrational from another,” so that “[t]o the extent 
that people share ends and beliefs, they can agree in their judgments of 
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To become meaningful—to become knowledge—information 
must be interpreted.  
This suggests that evaluations that are not continually 
examined for correspondence with reality will, with great 
likelihood, deviate from it. Without consistent attention to 
the relationship between the image and the world it 
represents—and without the assumption that any 
representation will leave out important factors—database 
prediction becomes less useful over time. But it also 
becomes more powerful. Watch lists tracking overlapping or 
redundant traits create the appearance of a proliferation of 
those traits—rather than a proliferation of watch lists. 
C. Effects on Society: Worldview and Urgency Mistakes 
Watch lists can have negative effects not only on agents, 
agencies, and governments, but also on society and policy 
more broadly. Scholars have amply demonstrated that 
government categorization profoundly affects both 
individuals’ self-conception and their social status—the way 
others, including the government itself, conceive of them. 
The effects of any particular database use are difficult to 
pinpoint, of course, and their evaluative process often not 
susceptible to empirical observation. But a number of 
studies of similar or related processes provide a solid basis 
on which to work by analogy in considering how watch lists 
can affect more than the people who run them. 
As numerous studies have shown, when governments 
and other powerful institutions create new social categories, 
“people . . . come to fit [those] categories” by reconceiving 
themselves in the categories’ terms.80 Perhaps the best 
  
rationality and irrationality; but to the extent ends and beliefs diverge, so too 
will judgments of rationality and irrationality.”).  
 80. Ian Hacking, Making Up People, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 161 
(Mario Biagioli ed., 1999). The full sentence is “[p]eople spontaneously come to 
fit their categories,” but Hacking follows it with a demonstration of how such 
“spontaneity” depends on social, historical, and economic structures through 
which new categorizations are institutionalized. See id. at 161-69. To describe 
this process, which can involve both the introduction of a classification by “a 
community of experts who create a ‘reality’ that some people make their own” 
and “the autonomous behavior of the person so labeled, which . . . creat[es] a 
reality every expert must face,” id. at 168, Hacking coins the term “dynamic 
nominalism”: a dynamic nominalist approach holds “not that there was a kind of 
person who came increasingly to be recognized by bureaucrats or by students of 
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known scholar in this vein is still Michel Foucault, whose 
theoretical work drew attention to how the category of 
normal behavior leads individuals to reinterpret their own 
conduct and its relation to society.81 Such studies have given 
empirical grounding to an insight vividly captured by Louis 
Althusser with the image of a person walking down the 
street when a policeman calls out, “[h]ey, you there!”82 
Without being named, the person stops and turns around.83 
He has been interpellated84—not just encompassed, but also 
defined and designated, by the state.85  
Some of the clearest demonstrations of this defining 
power come in studies of mass categorization in which 
governments assign ethnic, religious, or hierarchical status 
to people based on a few characteristics like place of birth, 
kinship structure, or profession.86 The individuals who are 
  
human nature but rather that a kind of person came into being at the same time 
as the kind itself was being invented.” Id. at 165.  
 81. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979) (1975) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND 
PUNISH]; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF 
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 38-64 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books 
1st ed. 1973) (1961); IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 
AND THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY 21-38 (1998) [hereinafter HACKING, REWRITING 
THE SOUL] (describing the emergence of multiple personality disorder as a new 
self-description that was then taken up by people who fit themselves into this 
new category until it receded from both professional psychological and popular 
attention); IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 1-3 (1990) [hereinafter 
HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE] (describing the historical emergence of the 
science of statistics, as a way of determining normality in a quantifiable way). 
 82. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN 
AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 174-75 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. The term interpellate puns on the combination of interpolate and name 
(appeler in French).  
 86. The Soviet government’s anti-nationalist policy of “institutionalized 
multinationality,” for instance, inscribed sub-state nationality—that is, a 
national belonging to one of the Soviet republics—in people’s passports in an 
attempt to control mobility and defuse political opposition. See ROGERS 
BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED: NATIONHOOD AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
IN THE NEW EUROPE 23, 32 (1996). Brubaker shows how this policy, which aimed 
at creating unity among the Soviet republics, actually strengthened national 
identities. See id. at 32. 
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defined by these new categories may initially feel little 
connection to one another. Indeed, the new categories may 
seem somewhat arbitrarily assigned. But the very power of 
government definitions opens up room for those people to 
form groups—often politically important ones—on the basis 
of their shared identification with these categories.87 
No less important is the way that others—such as 
governments themselves—come to view those who have 
been assigned to a category. Ian Haney López, for instance, 
has shown how case law on immigration status has helped 
mold social understandings of race in the United States.88 
Although a 1952 amendment eliminated race-based 
restrictions on naturalization, the jurisprudence that 
preceded the amendment helped shape the concept of race 
in America.89 Because the opportunity to naturalize was 
granted primarily to free “white person[s],” and “persons of 
African nativity, or African descent,”90 those who wished to 
naturalize were forced to frame their ethnicity in these 
governing terms, leading to a series of judicial opinions 
exploring, and cementing, particular notions of race.91 The 
theory the Supreme Court settled on, Haney López shows, 
presented racial belonging as something easily visible to the 
naked eye—a restrictive notion of cultural and visual 
similarity.92 This know-it-when-you-see-it understanding of 
race in the immigration context, Haney López argues, would 
have an enduring effect on American concepts of race 
generally. The immigration case law reinforced the concept 
of race as an inherent, obvious characteristic not subject to 
change over time, nor available to emendation due to new 
  
 87. For example, after the Chinese government consolidated a number of 
Muslim Chinese groups under the new catch-all category of Hui, the people so 
labeled came to use the classification as a unifying basis for pan-Hui political 
activism. See DRU C. GLADNEY, MUSLIM CHINESE: ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 6 (1996). Ian Hacking describes this process as the “looping 
effect of human kinds.” See HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL, supra note 81, at 21. 
 88. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
7, 12-13 (2006). Looking at medicine rather than law, Ian Hacking has analyzed 
how the recognition of multiple personality disorder led to its prevalence as a 
diagnosed condition. See HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL, supra note 81, at 8-9. 
 89. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 88, at 33. 
 90. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. See id. at 35. 
 92. See id. at 64. 
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information about migration patterns, linguistic 
development, or other historical facts.93  
Tracing a similar process in the colonial world, Bernard 
Cohn has shown that, although the Indian caste system 
appears to be an atavistic remnant of a premodern social 
system, it was largely created through the British colonial 
census.94 That census recorded individual attributes that 
defined people in important ways, but that had always been 
assumed to be subject to change over time.95 Census 
categories, in contrast, treated these attributes as 
unalterable signifiers of permanent social status.96 It thus 
reified hierarchies that had previously been responsive to 
both social and biographical change.97 Where caste had been 
an attribute of an individual at a certain time, the British 
census, which insisted that individuals be described in 
terms of its categories, made it into an eternal 
classification.98  
Such research suggests that the categories of people 
that populate database predictions can affect broadly held 
conceptions of society. By creating categories of people and 
making them seem prevalent, or rare, watch lists can affect 
how both government actors and the public at large 
understand the composition of society. This accords with 
social psychological research indicating that people’s 
assessments of risk depend on their cultural milieus, 
including on their own “group commitments” and the 
  
 93. See id. at 71-73. 
 94. See Bernard S. Cohn, The Census, Social Structure, and Objectification in 
South Asia, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AMONG THE HISTORIANS AND OTHER ESSAYS 
230 (1987). 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. at 230-31; see also COHN, COLONIALISM AND ITS FORMS OF 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 47, at 8 (“[W]hat was entailed in the construction of the 
census . . . was the creation of social categories by which India was ordered for 
administrative purposes. The British assumed that the census reflected the 
basic sociological facts of India. This it did, but . . . the project also objectified 
social, cultural, and linguistic differences among the peoples of India[,] . . . 
le[ading] to the reification of India as [a] polity in which conflict . . . could only 
be controlled by the strong hand of the British.”). 
 98. See Cohn, The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia, 
supra note 94, at 230. 
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opinions of others in their groups, as well the emotional 
valence of the conduct at issue for them and the ease with 
which they can imagine the risk coming to fruition.99 
Changing how people think society looks can have 
multiple effects. It can lead agents and members of the 
public to more readily assume that someone is a terrorist 
because watch lists have already assured them that many 
people are terrorists. It can lead someone to interpret a 
particular pattern revealed by combining information from 
different databases as significant because the size of 
terrorist watch lists has already assured her of the 
significance of such patterns. It can lead local law 
enforcement officers and low-level agency administrators to 
pay more attention to those who are—or look like they 
might be—watch-listed in ways that distract them from 
other risks. And it can lead government agencies and 
legislatures to overstate the likelihood and the probable 
severity of the risks they deal with, skewing the distribution 
of limited government resources by channeling them to 
address low-probability events and to support low-efficacy 
programs. 
Ironically, such effects are most likely in the very areas 
of high uncertainty that watch lists address. Government 
bodies that assess and understand the efficacy of their 
evaluative approaches can build that understanding into 
their predictions. They can, for instance, triangulate with 
external information, provide for regular reviews, or temper 
their reliance on evaluations in which they have less 
confidence. In contrast, where the government cannot, or 
will not, evaluate its own evaluative process, it cannot know 
how to modulate its reliance on its watch lists. This can 
make watch list evaluations less reliable without lessening 
the agency’s reliance on them. On the contrary, a database 
whose predictive processes are not acknowledged can 
appear even more reliable than one whose pressure points 
are recognized.100  
  
 99. See Kahan, supra note 58, at 120.  
 100. Cf. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, 
and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 721-24, 
783 (2007) (arguing that the government monopoly over forensic methods—
including their creation, testing, and execution—makes them particularly 
unreliable because they are subject to neither external oversight nor internal 
accountability checks). 
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The government as an institution has a pervasive power 
to shape social categories. Government databases like watch 
lists can thus affect how government agents and members 
of the public conceptualize their society and how they 
choose to distribute resources based on that 
conceptualization. That power can become dangerous when 
we forget that the image of society presented in database 
predictions is not a simple reflection of reality. Rather, it is 
a creature of our government. We should be able to discuss 
and assess not just the validity but also the desirability of 
imagining society in some particular way. But when we 
ignore the way that this image is created, we let the 
government off the normative hook. 
IV. THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL REGIME 
Many of the evaluations our government makes about 
us are constrained by a legal regime. Not only court 
judgments but many administrative conclusions must 
comport with the numerous requirements of due process 
and can be challenged if they fail to do so. Databases like 
watch lists, in contrast, are primarily governed by privacy 
law.101 That law constrains how the government gathers 
information and, to a smaller extent, what kind of 
information it uses.102 But it says little about evaluation, 
much less prediction. The predictive work performed in 
watch lists thus remains largely unregulated and 
unacknowledged by the law.  
This might be acceptable if watch lists had negligible 
effects. And from a certain perspective, they do: being listed 
as a terrorist suspect does not constitute probable cause for 
arrest.103 Yet watch listing clearly has effects on individuals. 
  
 101. See Cate, supra note 17, at 451 (documenting the scope of constitutional 
privacy protections for government database information); id. at 461 (discussing 
statutory provisions constraining government database information collection).  
 102. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 103. According to a draft update, for instance, the NCIC Technical Operational 
Manual warns that a VGTOF “Group Member Capability” entry—that is, an 
individual listing on the watch list—does not constitute probable cause for 
arrest, search, or seizure, though it may form part of the probable cause inquiry. 
See National Crime Information Center; Technical and Operational Update, 9 
(Nov. 7, 2005) (document produced in FOIA litigation) (NCIC-VGTOF-6891) (on 
file with author) (“[P]robable cause to search or seize is not established by the 
[VGTOF] record standing alone. . . . A caveat appears with every [VGTOF] 
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It can, as courts have begun to recognize, impinge on their 
right to travel.104 It can also change individuals’ status in 
the eyes of the law enforcement community, drawing extra 
scrutiny and suspicion. And although it cannot form the sole 
basis for probable cause, it can factor into a probable cause 
inquiry and a bail determination.105 Moreover, as Part III 
demonstrated, watch lists have governmental, political, and 
social effects that far exceed their individual encumbrances.  
In this broader frame, the absence of determinate legal 
consequences for the individual becomes only one concern. 
Government accountability, after all, accrues to all 
government actions, not just those with determinate legal 
consequences for individuals. Evaluating watch lists 
involves asking whether governments produce knowledge 
responsibly and accountably. As I show in this Part, current 
legal strictures, as well as scholarly analyses, skirt that 
crucial question.  
A. The Statutory Framework 
When Congress passed the Privacy Act in 1974, it knew 
it was dealing with something big. A Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) report had recently 
canvassed the unprecedented growth in government records 
about individuals, stressing the dangers it posed to a free 
society and proposing a number of “Fair Information 
  
record warning against search or seizure established solely on the record. This 
does not mean that a [VGTOF] record has no relevance to either reasonable 
suspicion to investigatively detain a record subject . . . , to arrest a record 
subject based on probable cause, or to search premises or vehicles based on 
probable cause.”). 
 104. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 105. See United States v. Duque, No. CR-09-265-D, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
102199, at *13-14 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2009) (describing presence on the Violent 
Gang and Terrorist Organization File as part of “officers’ collective knowledge,” 
reasonably used to determine probable cause for an arrest); Ted Metzger & Ann 
O’Neill, Protester Jailed, Denies He’s a Terrorist, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 6, 2012, 
7:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/06/politics/protester-arrest-
controversy/index.html (reporting that officer who arrested political protester 
for a minor traffic charge requested a judge to set bail at $10,000 and keep 
protester detained throughout a Democratic National Committee convention 
because the man was a “[k]nown activist + protester who is currently on a 
terrorist watch list”). 
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Practices” to protect individual rights.106 And a 
Congressional investigation headed by Senator Frank 
Church had yielded shocking revelations about the law 
enforcement community’s incursions into political groups—
the CoIntelPro activities that had disrupted lawful political 
activity, instigated violence through purposeful deception, 
and sought to discredit political activists by publicizing 
personal information about them.107 The Congress that 
passed the Privacy Act was primarily concerned with two 
possibilities: information in government databases might be 
incorrect due to data integrity problems, mistakes, or 
purposeful falsehoods—and it might be used 
inappropriately as it was in the CoIntelPro operations.108 
The growth of government records had occurred 
gradually and rather quietly. In 1909, for instance, Attorney 
General Charles Bonaparte testified to Congress that his 
Department had begun keeping records of “people who are 
actually in penitentiaries,” but denied any interest in 
keeping records about those who had been only arrested, 
not convicted.109 Ten years later, an unheralded report from 
  
 106. Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the Secretary’s 
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, HHS PRIVACY COMM. 
(July 1973), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/privacy/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) 
(noting vastly increased government information maintenance about 
individuals, examining its actual and potential problems, and proposing 
information management principles). 
 107. See, e.g., FRANK CHURCH, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF 
AMERICANS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL 
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 1-
20 (1976) [hereinafter Church Report]. 
 108. Cf. at 314 (documenting abuses); see generally WARD CHURCHILL & JIM 
VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI’S SECRET 
WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2002) (documenting 
abuses); WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE 
FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN MOVEMENT (1988) (documenting abuses). 
 109. The Prevention of Fraud in and Depredations Upon the Public Service: 
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Appropriations, 60th Cong. 424 (1909) 
(testimony of Charles Bonaparte, Attorney Gen. of the United States) (question 
by Congressman Fitzgerald). Attorney General Bonaparte noted that:  
Some persons have the idea that [collecting records of those arrested 
but not convicted] is of great value in the identification of criminals. 
How far that is well founded I am not prepared to express a positive 
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a special agent blithely noted just such an accounting, 
explaining that local law enforcement officials provided the 
federal government with finger prints and “records of arrest 
or conviction, as the case may be.”110  
As federal record keeping grew, Congress occasionally 
played catch-up to legalize practices that were already 
standard within the agencies.111 But just as often, there was 
no Congressional action at all: keeping records about 
individuals was increasingly simply something agencies 
did.112 Now, in the wake of the HEW report and the Church 
Committee revelations, that simple thing had become newly 
  
opinion. As far as our own records are concerned we merely take the 
records of the people who are at the federal penitentiaries. 
Id. at 425. Similarly, the Attorney General’s 1907 report to Congress describes 
the Department’s “criminal identification records” as records of “persons 
convicted of crimes against the United States.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1907, H.R. DOC. NO. 10, 
at 44 (1907) (noting that these records “have been removed for preservation 
from the United States penitentiaries to the Department of Justice”). 
 110. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 
YEAR 1920, H.R. DOC. NO. 886, at 641 (1920) (Report of Special Agent A. J. 
Renoe) (emphasis added). By 1930, “[a]rrangements were effected whereby all 
United States marshals now submit to the division the fingerprints of all 
persons taken into custody by them.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1930, H.R. DOC. NO. 530, at 80 
(1930). 
 111. For example, the FBI had been collecting criminal history records of some 
kind since the early part of the twentieth century. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1917, H.R. DOC. NO. 
595, at 89 (1917) (under the heading of “Bureau of Criminal Identification”); 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 
1911, H.R. DOC. NO. 117, at 22 (1911) (under the heading of “Bureau of 
Investigation”); H.R. DOC. NO. 10, supra note 109, at 44-45 (reporting criminal 
history record collection under the heading “Criminal Identification Records”). 
But it was not until 1930 that Congress officially recognized what the FBI was 
already doing by establishing a Division of Identification and Information 
charged with collecting “criminal identification and other crime records.” Act of 
June 11, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-337, 46 Stat. 554 (1930). 
 112. Agency information-collection activities in excess of statutory 
authorization appear, from this history, to be the norm rather than the 
exception. See, e.g., Doe v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. M-
54(HB), 2004 WL 1469464 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2004) (holding that the 
inclusion of non-criminal immigration information in the NCIC, which the 
government claimed was mandatory, was in fact contrary to the statute 
authorizing the NCIC).   
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controversial. Like a mother startled to find an unruly 
adolescent where she had last seen a docile child, members 
of Congress felt pressed to take action: not just to catch up 
with agency practices but to control them. 
Not surprisingly, they did so with a focus on individual 
rights. That is what the HEW report had worried about; 
that is what had been violated by CoIntelPro. While the 
Privacy Act went through numerous iterations and 
compromises, its central goal remained clear: to delineate 
and protect individuals’ right to control the flow of 
information about themselves.113 The preamble states that 
“[t]he privacy of an individual is directly affected by the 
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal 
information by Federal agencies,”114 and describes the act’s 
purpose as “provid[ing] certain safeguards for an individual 
against an invasion of personal privacy.”115 At the same 
time, the act leaves largely unregulated the kind of 
information the government may collect about 
individuals.116 Rather, it primarily controls how federal 
agencies gather, share, and store information about 
individuals.117  
  
 113. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. OPERATIONS AND H.R. COMM. ON GOV. 
OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 
2418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579): SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, VII (Comm. Print 1976); 
see also Alexi M. Poretz, Disclosure Under the Privacy Act: A Matter of 
Interpretation, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 802 (1997) (describing the Privacy 
Act as a measure that “safeguards individuals against the invasion of their 
personal privacy by restricting the manner in which federal agencies may 
collect, maintain, use, and disseminate certain personal information”). 
 114. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, § 2(a) (1974). 
 115. Id. § 2(b). 
 116. The primary exception is that the act prohibits an agency from 
maintaining records “describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2006). But it exempts from this 
restriction records that are “pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized 
law enforcement activity.” Id.  
 117. See, e.g., Poretz, supra note 113, at 802 (1997) (“The Privacy Act of 1974 
safeguards individuals against the invasion of their personal privacy by 
restricting the manner in which federal agencies may collect, maintain, use, and 
disseminate certain personal information.”). The Privacy Act also applies in 
limited ways to organizations other than federal agencies. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 
552a(a)(10)-(11), (o)(1). I do not address those applications here. 
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The Privacy Act relies mostly on external oversight: it 
gives people who are the subjects of agency records some 
knowledge about, and some control over, what those records 
say and how the information they hold is gathered, used, 
and distributed. The point is to limit agencies’ control over 
information by forcing them to let individuals know how the 
information is being used and who else got to see it, as well 
as providing ways for people to see, contest, and correct 
their records.118 The act also provides for some internal 
accountability, allowing agencies to collect only information 
that serves a specific legal purpose119 and requiring them to 
ensure that information is relevant, timely, and accurate.120  
As critics have noted, however, most of the powers that 
the Privacy Act takes away from agencies with one hand, it 
gives back with the other. Some provisions come with 
automatic exemptions. Agencies need not limit their 
distribution of records, for instance, if it falls within the 
stated “routine use” for which the information was 
collected—a use that the agency itself determines.121 
  
 118. For instance, the act requires agencies to publish and update notices in 
the Federal Register describing their databases, outlining the categories of 
records they hold and the categories of people they concern, and indicating the 
routine uses to which the records will be put. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(A)-(D) 
(requiring publication of System of Records Notices (SORN)). The act requires 
agencies to inform record subjects if their records will be distributed and seeks 
to limit the extent of that distribution. Id. § 552a(f)(1)-(4). It requires agencies to 
provide procedures for individuals to see and request the amendment of their 
own records, and allows for judicial review of an agency’s refusal to do so. See id. 
§ 552a(b). It requires each agency to establish a board to monitor its record 
storage procedures to ensure that the data are safe. Id. § 552a(u)(1)-(3). 
 119. Id. § 552a(e)(1). 
 120. Id. § 552a(e)(5). As a point of comparison, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) divides the database production process into the 
acquisition, retention, and use of information, with each stage subject to 
different requirements. See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL 
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 9:1 (2007). For instance, federal 
agents are required to “minimize” information disseminated to other parties, 
making retention and dissemination a complexly regulated decision. Id. At the 
same time, FISA minimization procedures primarily aim to protect the privacy 
of United States persons. Id. In this way, they mirror the concerns about privacy 
that I allude to. Despite more attention to how information is treated, then, 
FISA also does not address the classification issue per se. 
 121. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(7), (b)(3). There are other exceptions on this 
limitation, such as distribution to the agency’s own employees, for statistical 
purposes, or to save a life, but the routine use exception, as it is known, is 
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Agencies can also use other means to exempt their record 
systems from all but a few Privacy Act requirements.122 The 
  
probably the one that most undermines the original limitation. Id. § 552a(7), 
(b)(1), (4), (8); see, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 136 (2004) (noting that the “routine use” 
exception is the broadest exception); Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the 
Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An Examination of the 
Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 959-60 (1991) (noting that 
neither the executive nor Congress has not “actively overseen the exemption’s 
use[,] [n]or has Congress deterred continued abuse of the exemption,” and 
concluding that the breadth of the routine use exemption renders the act 
“impotent without more effective oversight”); John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 
1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the 
United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1003-04 (1984) (“All that is required to 
satisfy the . . . [Privacy] Act, the agencies say, is to publish each new computer-
matching [i.e. data-mining] ‘routine use’ in the Federal Register.”); see also 
Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy 
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 695 (2007) 
(proposing that Congress eliminate the routine use exception, instead requiring 
agencies to “specify, up front, exactly how personal data will be used and under 
what conditions it will be transferred to other government agencies”). But see 
Major Lassus, Routine Use Exception Under the Privacy Act of 1974 and the 
Requirement of Compatibility, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1991, at 45, 50 (asserting that, 
despite being obscured by the “Act’s convoluted evolution,” the Privacy Act 
routine use exception actually “impose[s] two requirements for release of records 
under [the routine use exception]—namely, the procedural requirement of 
‘notice’ and the substantive requirement of ‘compatibility’” with the original 
“‘purpose for which the information was collected’”).  
 122. Some records can be exempted through the act’s “General Exemptions” 
provision. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006). This subsection exempts a system of records 
from all but a small number of Privacy Act provisions, specifically those that 
require that agencies limit extra-agency disclosure to people with a need for the 
record; keep an account on those to whom a record is disclosed; publish notices 
describing systems of records in the Federal Register (so-called SORNs); make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that a record distributed to someone other than an 
agency is accurate, timely, complete, and relevant; not keep records on 
individuals’ exercise of their First Amendment rights unless a statute expressly 
authorizes it or the information collection falls within the scope of law 
enforcement activities; establish rules of conduct for people involved in database 
maintenance and creation; establish safeguards to ensure record security; and 
publish any new use of a system in the Federal Register with at least thirty 
days’ opportunity for comment before implementing it. See id.; see also id. 
§552a(b), (c)(1)-(2), (e)(4)(A)-(F), (e)(6)-(7), (e)(9)-(11). Other databases, including 
those that hold “investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes 
[but not falling] within” the general exemption requirements, can be exempted 
from several specific provisions. Id. § 552a(k). This section allows for exemption 
from provisions that require agencies to make available to individuals who 
 
506 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Privacy Act thus inscribes a limited right to control 
information about oneself while giving agencies leeway to 
deviate from that ideal.  
The Congress that passed the Privacy Act was 
concerned that government records could contain incorrect 
or false information and that information could be released 
in improper ways or for improper purposes.123 In this 
conceptualization, the information at issue exists 
independently of, and prior to, its acquisition by the 
government. The information the Privacy Act is concerned 
with emanates from the individual, from whom the 
government must acquire it.  
Commentators have long criticized the Privacy Act for 
insufficiently safeguarding individual rights and failing to 
update what safeguards exist to keep pace with 
technological developments.124 But an even greater 
limitation is the act’s understanding of databases and the 
work that they do. The Privacy Act treats databases as 
  
request it an account of how their records have been disclosed to others; allow 
individuals to access, review, have a copy of, and request amendment of their 
records; acknowledge such requests for amendment and either implement them 
or explain a refusal to do so; allow individuals to file a statement of 
disagreement with the agency’s decision and inform them of the availability of 
judicial review; note any such disagreement in subsequent dissemination of the 
record (except for information compiled in preparation for civil litigation); 
publish a system of records notice in the Federal Register that informs people 
how to find out if records pertain to them, access their records, and contest 
record contents, and that describes the categories of records in the system; and 
establish procedures to implement the notification, access, dispute and 
amendment provisions. See id.; see also id. § 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G)-(I), 
(f). Aside from law enforcement databases, this exemption can also apply to 
records exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA’s) 
national security exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), and records “maintained in 
connection with providing protective services to the President of the United 
States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of title 18.” Id. § 552a(k)(3). 
 123. See Privacy Act of 1974 § 2(a), 88 Stat. at 1896. 
 124. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 137, 138, 179 (2008) (arguing that U.S. privacy law’s focus on data 
collection improperly overlooks important changes in data retention that 
changes how governments collect information and what information is available 
to them); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 877, 877, 898 (2002-2003) (arguing that the United States lacks 
“well-established legal rights” of privacy, and new legal rights must be created 
to remedy policy violations); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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mere repositories for storing information. It regulates only 
the government’s power to gather or use information. Watch 
lists, however, exceed those activities. They involve 
evaluating information and predicting future conduct—acts 
the Privacy Act does not address. This means that, while 
watch lists fall into the Privacy Act’s bailiwick, they also fall 
through its cracks.  
B. The Doctrinal Context 
Courts have not laid out what process, if any, an agency 
must give a person it plans to put on a watch list. The No 
Fly List cases discussed in the Introduction will serve as 
test cases addressing that issue. But as this Article has 
suggested, those cases do not address the larger and more 
complex watch list infrastructure underlying the No Fly 
List itself.  
Individuals, meanwhile, have found little recourse 
against agencies in this realm. For one thing, it is difficult 
to find out that one is watch-listed.125 While someone denied 
boarding at an airport may infer that she is on the No Fly 
List, most individual repercussions of watch listing are 
more discreet. They come in the form of heightened 
attention from law enforcement agents126 and others given 
  
 125. See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 295-
96 (D. Conn. 2008) (explaining that, in accordance with its policy, the FBI 
“refuses to confirm or deny” the existence of VGTOF records responsive to a 
Freedom of Information Act request). 
 126. For instance, an officer who queries the NCIC for a name that is listed in 
the VGTOF may be instructed by the VGTOF text to “APPROACH WITH 
CAUTION” and “DETAIN THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR A REASONABLE 
AMOUNT OF TIME FOR QUESTIONING” because the “INDIVIDUAL IS OF 
INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO LAW ENFORCEMENT REGARDING 
ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORISM”; the officer will likely be instructed to also 
“IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER.” 
National Crime Information Center; Technical and Operational Update, 13 
(Nov. 7, 2005) (document produced in FOIA litigation) (NCIC-VGTOF-6895) (on 
file with author). The officer may receive slightly different instructions 
depending on how the individual is listed, but in every case the implication is 
that the officer should pay particularly careful attention to the individual. See 
id. 13-14 (NCIC-VGTOF-6895-96) (“ASK PROBING QUESTIONS TO 
DETERMINE IF THIS INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEREST. . . . APPROACH WITH CAUTION. . . . DO 
NOT ADVISE THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY ARE ON A TERRORIST 
WATCHLIST.”). While there have been no studies so far of exactly how watch 
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access to watch list entries, which may include private 
institutions and non-law enforcement governmental 
entities.127 Agencies do not disclose watch list status to the 
individual.128  
Even if a person is able to discover that she is on a 
watch list, she has few avenues of action available. In the 
1970s, a line of case law in the D.C. Circuit held that 
statutes authorizing law enforcement databases themselves 
provide an avenue of redress for people listed incorrectly.129 
Another line of cases holds that, even absent a statutory 
cause of action, courts have inherent equitable authority to 
expunge government records about individuals.130 That 
reasoning was used to expunge arrest records when the 
arrests were found to have been without probable cause and 
for unconstitutional purposes, or when the laws underlying 
  
lists affect the exercise of law enforcement agent discretion, scholarship has 
demonstrated that law enforcement officers tend to give increased scrutiny to 
people with arrest records even in the absence of subsequent charges or 
convictions. Note, The Impact of Arrest Records on the Exercise of Police 
Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 295-98 (1984) (detailing how, 
despite the absence of a necessary relation between arrest records and past 
criminality and a lack of evidence that arrest records function as useful 
predictors of future criminality, arrest records significantly affect the exercise of 
police discretion). It is likely that terrorist watch list entries have similar effects 
on discretion, especially since the watch list itself instructs officers to increase 
their level of scrutiny. 
 127. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(a) (2012) (authorizing the FBI to share NCIC 
records with banks, “certain segments of the securities industry,” “registered 
futures associations,” “nuclear power plants,” and “state and local governments 
for the purposes of employment and licensing”). 
 128. See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 258 F.R.D. 198, 205 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (asserting that the FBI “properly refused to confirm or deny 
whether [an individual] was listed in the VGTOF” in a Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) case, but noting that the balance of interests was different in civil 
litigation discovery).  
 129. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding 
that the statute authorizing the FBI to collect criminal identity information 
implicitly required the FBI to take “reasonable precautions to prevent 
inaccuracy”); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding 
that the statute authorizing the NCIC impliedly provided a remedy for someone 
contesting a record of an arrest that lacked probable cause because the FBI had 
an affirmative duty to maintain accurate criminal identification files). 
 130. See Menard, 498 F.2d at 1025. 
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the arrests have been found to be unconstitutional.131 But as 
the Supreme Court moved away from implied rights of 
action over the following decades,132 these lines of reasoning 
grew fallow.133 Moreover, the passage of the Privacy Act in 
1974 appeared to provide a statutory avenue of redress even 
though, as discussed in the previous Section, it provides 
redress only for inaccurate reporting of existing 
information—not for spurious predictions or mistaken 
evaluations.134 Indeed, precisely because of the subjective 
and often vague criteria for inclusion in a watch list—not to 
mention their secrecy—it is difficult to contest watch listing 
on the grounds of inaccuracy.  
The Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) grant of 
judicial review to “person[s] . . . adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action” is also of limited use in the 
watch list context.135 The adverse effects of watch listing on 
an individual include higher scrutiny from a law 
enforcement officer, prospective employer, and others.136 
Such increased scrutiny has been shown to influence the 
exercise of discretion. Even arrest records with no 
subsequent records of conviction, which have not been 
shown to predict future criminal behavior, influence law 
enforcement agent behavior with respect to suspects.137 
Given the heightened state of terrorism fear that has 
characterized American law enforcement since the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, it is safe to conjecture that being on a 
  
 131. Id. 
 132. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (placing strict limits on a court’s 
ability to imply a private right of action based on general government 
responsibilities absent a specific statutory grant). 
 133. See, e.g., El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 279-80 (declining to infer a cause 
of action in the statute authorizing the FBI to collect criminal information 
because the statute did not explicitly waive sovereign immunity).  
 134. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 135. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 136. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
 137. The Impact of Arrest Records on the Exercise of Police Discretion, supra 
note 126, at 295-98; see also Herman Goldstein, Confronting the Complexity of 
the Policing Function, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION 
BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 23, 33-34 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank 
J. Remington eds., 1993); H. Richard Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police 
Discretion in the Credibility Call, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 28 (1984). 
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terrorist watch list will have serious effects on an 
individual’s interaction with government agents. Indeed, as 
Seth Kreimer has written, “the discretion of the modern 
administrative state is well adapted to low visibility 
retaliation,” in which lists ostensibly compiled for law 
enforcement purposes can end up being used as tools for 
selective prosecution or auditing.138 Moreover, the very 
knowledge that one may be the object of government 
scrutiny can itself inhibit otherwise licit activities.139  
Nonetheless, such aggrievement is difficult to cognize in 
court because it is difficult to pinpoint an actual or 
imminent concrete harm, as required for standing.140 
Whether a court will interpret the predictable effects of 
watch listing as an imminent threat depends as much on 
the judge’s view of standing as on the actual effects of watch 
listing. And many adverse effects of watch listing, such as 
visa refusals for foreign nationals, are simply discretionary 
and not subject to judicial review.141 A court will not find 
aggrievement where a person has no right to any particular 
outcome.  
Someone who can demonstrate standing should in 
principle have access to judicial review of his watch list 
status under the APA. But even in that situation, a plaintiff 
will face an uphill battle. The APA precludes relief when 
“any other statute that [waives sovereign immunity] 
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”142 
If the watch list has been exempted from Privacy Act 
requirements, as all terrorists watch lists have, the APA 
provision may render any form of relief under the Privacy 
Act unavailable, because the exemption prevents relief.  
  
 138. Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and 
Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 150 (2004). 
 139. Id. at 155 (“Fear or suspicion that one’s speech is being monitored . . ., 
even without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect 
upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.”) (quoting Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001)).   
 140. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
 141. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (discussing the doctrine of “consular unreviewability,” which bars 
judicial review of visa issuance or refusal except in limited circumstances). 
 142. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
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As the recent No Fly List cases demonstrate, there is 
one avenue left to a prospective plaintiff: to sue to 
expunge—rather than correct—the record, or for additional 
process in contesting its existence. Those forms of relief are 
not available under the Privacy Act and therefore not 
precluded by exemption from it.143 Still, as the novelty of 
these cases illustrates, it is only the rare plaintiff who can 
fulfill the requirements necessary to sustain a suit. The real 
problem, though, as I discuss in the following section, is 
that litigation is simply not well suited to address systemic 
problems in agency functioning.   
C. The Privacy Paradigm and the Language of Litigation 
Scholarship on watch lists shares the legal regime’s 
predilections. Scholars writing about government databases 
generally tend to focus on the way individual privacy rights 
bump up against the needs of the nation.144 Like the law, the 
literature tends to elide the evaluation and prediction that 
go into making a watch list. 
Like the law, scholars focus on individual privacy,145 
specifically, what is known as information or data privacy.146 
  
 143. Even in such a case, at least one court has concluded that sovereign 
immunity bars the suit. Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 
249, 279-80 (D. Conn. 2008). Although the Badrawi court did not make clear 
how the APA figured in its determination, the implication is that it did not see 
the plaintiff as having been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,” 
which is required for the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See 
Administrative Procedure Act § 702. 
 144. See Shattuck, supra note 121, at 992 (concluding that including 
“information about the non-criminal activities of persons under surveillance by 
the Secret Service” in the National Crime Information Center database clearly 
violates basic privacy rights); Spencer, supra note 31, at 519 (arguing that 
presenting database use as a privacy-security trade-off encourages valuing 
security over privacy by “fail[ing] to account for the many unintended 
consequences that usually flow from security measures” and presenting security 
benefits as unrealistically tangible and certain while presenting privacy harms 
as unrealistically abstract and hypothetical); compare, e.g., Soma, supra note 31, 
at 287 (“[H]istorically, a return to equilibrium has occurred as the initial threat 
dissipates.”), with Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The 
Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 838 (1971). 
 145. Scholars have been at pains to find something that unifies the diverse 
areas to which American law has applied the label of privacy. Jerry Kang has 
posited that there are three kinds of privacy rights in American law that assure 
individuals decisional (personal choices), spatial (physical sphere), and 
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Some commentators working in this vein stress the 
psychological importance of information privacy in 
constituting individual identities.147 They argue that data 
collection impinges on the construction and expression of 
the self148 and exacerbates power inequalities between the 
surveilling agent and the surveilled subject.149 They also 
  
informational (personal information) control. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy 
in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-05 (1998). This 
typology covers the areas that United States law sees as implicating privacy, 
but does not suggest an underlying concept uniting the typological 
components—perhaps reflecting the lack of underlying logic connecting the 
arenas that United States law has labeled private. While accurately depicting 
the legal distribution of privacy, this typology also emphasizes that the 
American legal conception of privacy rests on doctrinal development and 
political history, not on the recognition of an independent entity in the natural 
or the social world.   
 146. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of 
Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 358 (2006). 
 147. Some scholars worry that information-gathering about individuals 
impinges on the construction and the expression of individuality itself. They 
posit that being observed—either physically or informationally—imposes a kind 
of chilling effect on conduct, constraining how people feel they can act and 
therefore who they can be. Such writers investigate how surveillance can 
organize situations in ways that affect how people behave, and how people feel 
they can behave. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and 
Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 194 (2008) (describing surveillance as 
constricting “the parameters of evolving subjectivity” and limiting how 
particular spaces can “function as contexts within which identity is developed 
and performed”); Luciano Floridi, The Ontological Interpretation of 
Informational Privacy, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 185, 195 (2005) (positing that 
persons are constituted by their personal information and interpreting 
information privacy as a protection of personal identity); see generally 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 81, at 125-31 (describing the 
increased surveillance practices of modern institutions as regimenting and 
evaluating individuals according to a norm that is presented as universally 
applicable in ways that constrict individual behavior even absent direct 
coercion).  
 148. See, e.g., Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster, The Intensification of 
Surveillance, in THE INTENSIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE: CRIME, TERRORISM AND 
WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 13-14 (Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster eds., 
2003) (identifying one problem with information-gathering about individuals as 
the inevitably partial quality of the knowledge garnered, which gives the 
surveillor access to the individual’s actions but not his motivations or his real 
inner self).  
 149. See, e.g., id. at 14 (positing that one problem with increased surveillance 
is the fact that observers, who “are frequently not known to the subject,” can use 
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show how data collection can threaten the very possibility of 
community by violating the interactional patterns that 
weave communities together, making membership more 
perilous and therefore less likely.150 Others emphasize the 
legal importance of allowing people to keep information 
secret or make it accurate, arguing that due process and 
privacy rights are at stake in the government’s collection of 
individual information.151 Still others focus on the paucity of 
  
their surveillance for ends the subject does not know about, even though “to 
garner information for disguised purposes is morally dubious”).  
 150. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. 
REV. 119, 137 (2004) (suggesting that each sphere of social life is governed by 
“norms of information flow” that define the kinds of information exchange 
appropriate to that context and determine what counts as privacy in that 
context); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and 
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989) (proposing that 
the concept of privacy “safeguards [the] rules of civility that . . . constitute both 
individuals and community”); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks 
Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 974 (2005) (suggesting that whether 
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a given context should 
depend on how information usually travels in that particular context). Daniel 
Solove, a prominent privacy scholar, has described American thought on privacy 
as comprising six primary strands or approaches. While Solove is concerned to 
point out their differences, it turns out that each of the six centers on the kinds 
of individual rights issues discussed above: control over information about the 
individual and the individual’s ability to constitute himself within his 
community. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12-34 (2008). These 
strands of thought see privacy as: 1) a right to insist on “seclusion,” id. at 18; 2) 
an ability to “conceal[]” or limit access to the individual, id.; 3) a right to secrecy, 
id. at 21; 4) control over the flow of information about one’s person, id. at 25; 5) 
freedom from the objectifying effects of surveillance, which intrudes on the 
aspects of personhood, selfhood, or subjectivity that inheres in limiting the flow 
of information about one’s person, id. at 29; and 6) a prerequisite for intimate 
relationships and other kinds self- and community-constitution that depend on 
interpersonal motivations and choices, id. at 34. Similarly, Solove’s own book-
length study of public and private databases focuses on problems involving the 
gathering, maintenance, and dissemination of individual information, like 
people’s inability to correct mistakes in database records, the government’s 
tendency to collect information that it does not need or ought not have, the lack 
of legal protection afforded information voluntarily revealed to third parties, 
and the difficulty of keeping data secure. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2-8 (2004). 
 151. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Bond, Note, Defining Disclosure in a Digital Age: 
Updating the Privacy Act for the Twenty-First Century, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1232, 1237 (2008) (arguing that the Privacy Act should be amended to further 
protect private information from disclosure); Shaina N. Elias, Essay, Challenges 
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privacy protections in American law and on the 
technological and legal trends that threaten the protections 
that do exist.152 
Some scholars working on databases generally do 
recognize that surveillance affects not just individuals, but 
  
to Inclusion on the “No-Fly List” Should Fly in District Court: Considering the 
Jurisdictional Implications of Administrative Agency Structure, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1015, 1032 (2009) (urging courts to interpret statutes so as to give 
travelers a way to challenge inclusion on such lists); Justin Florence, Note, 
Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 
YALE L.J. 2148, 2165-81 (2006) (urging agencies to adopt procedures that 
respect people’s right to have notice and an opportunity to heard on their 
status); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (positing that the Fourth Amendment protects arenas in which an 
individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”); Shaun B. Spencer, 
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 
913-16 (2002) (arguing that privacy practices affect privacy rights, insofar as 
increasing government data collection conditions people to expect fewer rights 
and less privacy to begin with). 
 152. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A 
Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
609, 610 (2007) (“The dangers of any large-scale government effort to collect, 
catalogue, and manipulate information on individuals are never far-fetched.”). 
Bignami urges the United States to move toward a privacy regime more closely 
aligned with the more stringent laws of the major European countries, which 
recognize individual information privacy as a fundamental right; strictly limit 
private entity data collection and retention; require that government data-
collection be specifically authorized by statutes and subject to proportionality 
review; and enforce privacy rights through a dedicated, independent agency. Id. 
at 635-36, 653. Others warn that legal restrictions on government information-
gathering have not kept pace with technological developments that allow for 
less legally encumbered, but more effective, government information gathering. 
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 137, 138 (2008). Bellia notes that U.S. privacy law restricts the 
government’s “collection and disclosure of certain kinds of information,” but 
leaves the retention of information virtually unregulated. Id. Because the 
collection and retention of data by private parties, such as service providers, is 
also largely unregulated in the United States, Bellia argues, government 
agencies can effectively circumvent legal strictures on real-time surveillance by 
simply collecting retained data from private third party providers. Id. at 140. 
This is facilitated not only by the relatively lax regulation of private parties, but 
by technological developments that have rendered third-party data retention 
increasingly cost-less and ubiquitous. Id. Bellia urges legal reforms to 
ameliorate the “surveillance-enhancing effects” of this new “architecture of 
memory” in which little is forgotten. Id. 
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entire societies.153 And some have noted that databases not 
only collect information about individuals but provide 
models on which to “make inferences” about how those 
individuals will behave—specifically, how they will spend 
money.154 Even this literature, however, generally skips 
straight to effects on the individual: it does not ask how 
those who work with databases form their predictions. 
This literature also tends to assume that information 
gathering is always pernicious. This may be why, for this 
approach, the difference between good and bad predictions 
is not really that important: each is morally repulsive in its 
own way.155 Bad predictions show that information 
gathering yields only a partial picture, because economistic 
models can never capture the intricate complexity of 
individual identity. Good predictions instantiate the harms 
of surveillance, showing how it constricts free will and 
individuality in ways that impinge on our very humanity.  
Whatever the value of this assumption in the private 
sphere,156 it is less tenable in the public law arena, where 
  
 153. See, e.g., Ball & Webster, supra note 148, at 12; David Lyon, Surveillance 
as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS 
SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 13, 16-17 (David 
Lyon ed., 2003). 
 154. OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 53 (1993) (quoting KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT 
ANALYSIS 37 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gandy generally 
discusses how private parties gather and organize information about individuals 
to sort them by economic roles and proclivities, thus “reduc[ing] . . . uncertainty 
about individual behavior” in ways that have become “central” to capitalism. Id. 
at 45; see id. at 1 (calling this process “the difference machine that guides the 
global capitalist system”). Scholars have noted that such predictions themselves 
affect economic conduct by constraining the available kinds of money-spending 
opportunities that people are presented with. People’s incomes determine the 
kind of marketing they receive; their credit histories determine the amount of 
credit they are offered; their medical symptoms influence the cost of their health 
insurance. See Lyon, supra note 153, at 14, 21, 27. 
 155. Gandy, for instance, asserts that economic sorting systems are “based on 
theoretical models that reflect quite transitory fads or trends in social, 
economic, and political thought,” GANDY, supra note 154, at 2-3. But he also 
warns that the mechanism’s “methods are constantly being adjusted as” their 
conclusions “are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the realization of the 
organization’s goals,” which suggests increasing accuracy over time. Id. at 55. 
 156. In the private, economic arena, such studies tend to frame information 
practices as pitting corporations and their profit motives against individuals 
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both the harms and the benefits of watch lists redound on 
the same society.157 Different evaluative approaches and the 
difference between good and bad predictions should matter 
to the analysis of government databases, which implicate 
questions of government conduct and resource distribution 
as well as national well-being.  
The literature’s focus on individual rights, which 
mirrors the values inscribed in the Privacy Act, fits 
comfortably into the more general study of privacy in the 
United States, which from its start has been animated by a 
concern with the collection and dissemination of 
information.158 It also goes along with a search for individual 
remedies, usually phrased in the language of litigation.159 
This makes sense: our system presents individual rights as 
vindicated primarily through courts and court-like 
proceedings.160 The normal concerns of courts—like whether 
  
and their nonprofit communities. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 153, at 14. Even in 
the private sphere, however, arguments can be made for the benefits of accurate 
market categorization: one person’s higher interest rate might result in 
another’s easier access to credit.  
 157. Indeed, the goal of many predictive government databases is precisely to 
constrain individual freedom—for instance to engage in violent behavior—to 
benefit society at large. 
 158. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 197-214 (1890). The beginning of American privacy law is usually 
dated to a well-known 1890 article in which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
first posited that the law protected a right to individual privacy. See id. By this 
they meant that the individual had a kind of authorial right, as the creator of 
the news or image in which he figured, to decide whether it should be made 
public. Id. at 204. At the same time, for Warren and Brandeis this kind of 
control was superior to a mere right to intellectual property. It instantiated a 
“more general right . . . to be let alone,” or, more grandiosely, a right to one’s 
own “inviolate personality.” Id. at 205. The authors thus proposed to limit the 
personal information available to other people. Id. at 214-20. They did not 
discuss what people do with the personal information they get. That evaluative 
step has largely lurked in the background of scholarship on privacy and, by 
extension, on government databases. 
 159. For instance, commentators consider how individuals can contest 
inclusion in a database through court or court-like processes. See, e.g., Elias, 
supra note 151, at 1017, 1029-32 (urging courts to interpret statutes so as to 
give travelers a way to challenge inclusion on such lists); Florence, supra note 
151, at 2180-81 (urging agencies to adopt procedures that respect people’s right 
to have notice and an opportunity to heard on their status). 
 160. The orientation toward litigation, based on a concern with individual 
rights, is not confined to the arena of databases or of privacy. Robert Kagan has, 
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including information in a database imposes harms 
sufficient to support standing—naturally come into play.  
But asking whether someone has suffered standing-
worthy harm helps us analyze only the propriety of bringing 
certain issues to court. It does not help us analyze the 
issues themselves.161 The language of litigation can thus 
  
for instance, demonstrated how legal process in America tends to get funneled 
into judicial process, creating a “method of policymaking” focused on “rights, 
duties, and procedural requirements” rather than cooperation, cost-efficiency, or 
efficacy. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9 
(2001). Kagan documents this tendency in the regulatory, as well as in the 
criminal and civil context, and concludes that the centrality of judicial process to 
American policy and dispute resolution creates a system in which outcomes are 
less predictable, but resolutions more costly, than in comparable advanced 
democracies. Id. at 3-4. Problems are also more likely to be resolved through 
litigation in the first place; judges are more influenced by personal politics; 
lawyers play a larger part in shaping legal outcomes even when those outcomes 
affect more than just their clients; legal change depends more on the pursuit of 
interests by organized groups; and penalties for loss are stiffer. Id. at 3. In the 
regulatory context, this leads to a nitpicky and adversarial regulatory style that 
tends to prescribe precise methods and actions rather than overall goals and in 
which regulators and regulated parties are pitted against one another, often in 
court, rather than aiming for cooperative relationships. See id. at 191. Kagan 
finds that this regulatory style is both more expensive and less effective than 
the more goal-oriented, cooperative style of comparable nations. Id. at 3-4, 191-
92. He also suggests that this trend has been with us for some time, quoting 
Tocqueville’s comment that “[s]carcely any political question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved . . . into a judicial question.” Id. at vii (quoting 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Vintage Books 1945) 
(1835)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Article 
III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of 
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 939-46, 997-1000 (2011) 
(suggesting that American-style judicial review of administrative action, in 
which courts not only determine whether an agency acted within its authority 
but also adjudicate what are effectively policy judgments, may lead to a 
somewhat chaotic jurisprudence based in policy preference and a continuing 
incorporation of time-bound administrative trends in place of technocratic 
expertise or executive policy decisions).  
 161. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 15 (1983) (showing that even administrative action 
that has direct effects on individuals and their rights functions primarily via an 
“internal law of administration” that precedes, and is largely invisible to, 
judicial review). As Mashaw demonstrates, focusing on judicial review of 
administrative action largely misses the point: because the ongoing work of 
administration happens not in courts but in administrative agencies, court 
appearances mark only the exceptional moments when administration is pulled 
out of the agency. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
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unproductively constrain analysis, directing it away from 
broader questions of accountability in a representative 
democracy.162  
The litigation-oriented search for a discrete act that 
violates a particular right or imposes a particular harm 
does not capture the power of predictive database use.163 
Neither does the framework of privacy, which focuses on the 
individual’s ability to keep independently extant 
information from circulation or to cordon off certain areas of 
conduct from government control.164 It is not that rights are 
not at stake; it is just that more is at stake than rights. 
V. TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL REGIME  
Existing laws controlling terrorist watch lists focus on 
factual accuracy and individual rights, not on predictive 
  
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 302-06 (2012). Relatedly, William Chase has traced the long-time academic 
focus on courts in administrative law to the structure of legal education, which, 
“intensely committed to the study and teaching of the work product of the 
traditional courts,” framed the study of administration as a study of what courts 
thought about administration. WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL 
AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 20 (1982). 
 162. Richard Thompson Ford has also criticized the court-centered approach of 
American law, scholarship, and politics from a different but related perspective, 
arguing that this approach degrades the goals of social movements by shifting 
attention from structural impediments to equality and other social problems, 
instead keeping people focused on the narrower, and malleable, question of 
individual rights. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW 
LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 21 (2011) (“[R]ights cannot change 
deep-seated institutional and cultural injustices without changing the 
institutions and culture in which they are rooted.”).  
 163. For a discussion of ways in which arbitrary classification may infringe on 
rights other than privacy, see Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty 
Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2010) (arguing that “the rule against 
singling out persons for punishment without trial” which constitutes the 
Constitutional ban on bills of attainder “should be recognized as a due process 
liberty interest” to render improper inclusion on a government blacklist 
actionable).  
 164. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1162-63 (2004) (describing American notions 
of privacy as focused on limiting state control over certain areas of life, while 
European notions focus on limiting the distribution of information about 
individuals more generally). 
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process and broad effects. The distinctive power of these 
databases to shape political policy and social imaginaries 
therefore remains largely unregulated and 
unacknowledged. When we look beyond individual rights 
and ask about the government’s responsibilities to the 
society it shapes, however, it is this distinctive power that 
calls out for constraint.  
Creating those constraints is no easy task for three 
primary reasons. First, there is no precise science to 
predicting human conduct. It is difficult to require 
governments to use reliable predictive methods when we do 
not know which methods are reliable. Second, the social 
effects of watch lists emerge gradually and are not easily 
tracked. It is difficult to require governments to minimize or 
control a watch list’s social effects when we do not know 
how, or how much, it will affect society. Third, watch lists 
are subject to complex pressures. We want them to be 
correct in their predictions, but not so all-knowing that they 
create social classes. We want them to be complete, but not 
to skew our perceptions of the conduct they address or allow 
arbitrary classifications. And we want them to be cost-
justified, but do not always know how to measure their costs 
and benefits. It is difficult to require governments to change 
their practices when we want the changes to have multiple, 
possibly incongruent, effects. 
At the same time, such difficulties are not new to 
agencies that regulate conduct. Limits on knowledge, 
resources, and authority make devising effective regulations 
difficult. Competing interests complicate regulatory goals. 
Yet agencies still act in the face of these difficulties. 
Creating an effective legal regime to constrain watch lists 
entails applying to the government the very kind of goal-
oriented mandates, based on partial knowledge, that 
government agencies often apply to those they regulate. It 
means implementing an “internal law of administration” 
that resembles in crucial respects external administrative 
regulations.165  
  
 165. Cf. Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 
(2010). Rascoff argues that the traditional analogy of domestic intelligence to 
criminal law enforcement has led to a “governance vacuum,” id. at 582, because 
the analogy belies the actual work of intelligence. Id. at 581-82. Intelligence 
work, Rascoff argues, is essentially a kind of “risk assessment,” a crucial 
underlying feature of regulation. Id. at 582. Intelligence work is, therefore, 
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As I discuss above, research on institutional knowledge 
production suggests that the more institutions buy into 
their own claims to possess full, objective knowledge about a 
given object, the more likely they are to fail to notice aspects 
of the object that exceed their grasp. This suggests, perhaps 
paradoxically, that accountable prediction requires a good 
dose of self-doubt. This Part proposes ways to build self-
doubt into watch lists.  
A. Feedback, Internal Consistency, Updating, 
Acknowledged Subjectivity 
Agencies should be required to create feedback 
mechanisms that allow for continual assessments of the 
extent to which watch list predictions prove correct. 
Agencies should use those feedback inquiries to determine 
whether a watch list is internally consistent, in the sense 
that it actually targets the kind of activity it is meant to 
address. When there is inaccuracy or inconsistency, 
agencies should update their watch list processes and 
predictions accordingly. I also suggest that agencies should 
explicitly acknowledge the subjectivity inherent in watch list 
judgment, illuminating rather than obscuring the moments 
at which evaluative judgment comes into play.  
My proposals ask agencies to assess both the quality of 
their watch lists and the process by which they are 
produced. And they require agencies to act on those 
assessments. Currently, watch list costs are presumed to be 
negligible. That assumption relieves agencies of assessing 
their benefits. Once we acknowledge that watch lists exact 
costs even beyond their monetary upkeep, it is clear that 
they require assessment and improvement.  
To implement feedback and updating, watch lists 
should be structured with the assumption that both 
predictions and predictive processes will require 
amendment. Individual listings should be subject to 
revision, of course: new information should affect old 
decisions. But so should predictive criteria and the theory 
  
amenable to the full array of regulatory governance tools. See id; see also Jerry 
L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative 
Law in the Republican Era 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1739 (2007) 
(discussing the “internal law of administration” as a system of administrative 
self-constraint). 
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that connects them to the relevant conduct: the system 
should have provisions not only for altering individual 
predictions, but also for changing how agents make 
predictions in the first place.166 
At present, watch lists lack such provisions. Instead, 
they reflect confidence that the assumptions guiding them 
will hold true and that their predictions will be correct. 
Instead of regular self-assessments built into the evaluative 
process, they are often subject only to partial or periodic 
external reviews, such as the occasional studies carried out 
by inspectors general or the Government Accountability 
Office.167 Each such review has its own focus, objectives, and 
methods, leading to evaluations that, though often 
excellent, are still piecemeal.168 
Commentators have pressed for administrative agencies 
to be subject to more frequent, more regular, and more 
searching evaluations. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, for 
instance, has proposed creating an independent commission 
to audit discretionary agency actions.169 Cuéllar suggests 
evaluating random samples of discretionary decisions to see 
how well they adhere to decision-making standards 
articulated prior to the review.170 In contrast to judicial 
review, which casts only a limited light on a very few agency 
actions, in-depth audits would give legislatures, the public, 
  
 166. The consolidated terrorist identity watch list operated by the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) does have mechanisms for removing 
individuals from the watch list, though these are in practice often not 
implemented. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST 
NOMINATION PRACTICES, supra note 53, at xvi (finding, in a sample of eighty-five 
closed investigations, that seventeen entries correctly remained on the watch 
list for other reasons or were properly removed in a timely manner; sixty-one 
entries were properly removed but not in a timely manner; and seven entries 
improperly remained on the list). What is required, though, is not only a way to 
adjust individual listings but a way to change systemic criteria for listing. 
 167. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 227, 291 (2006) (discussing the limitations of current executive 
review mechanisms).  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 231-32. 
 170. Id. at 240. 
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and agencies themselves a better understanding of everyday 
administrative activities.171  
Relatedly, Michael Greenstone has proposed creating a 
new legislative office to evaluate the actual impact of 
regulations over time.172 He also suggests establishing a 
standard, agency-internal “retrospective analysis” of the 
actual effects, including the actual costs and benefits, of 
regulations.173 These proposals aim to overcome the 
unrealistic optimism endemic to American administration, 
which historically has estimated the “likely benefits and 
costs” of regulations “before they are enacted.”174 “[B]ecause 
the regulations are untested” prior to their enactment, 
however, it is impossible to assess their actual effects.175 
This administrative attitude thus has things a bit 
backward, as “[o]nce a regulation is implemented, it goes on 
the books and generally stays there unexamined for years 
and in some cases decades,”176 even if its costs or benefits 
differ from those predicted. 
Cuéllar and Greenstone suggest that regular 
assessments of government actions can help overcome the 
unrealistic impulses of decision makers by confronting them 
with the actual results of their decisions.177 Watch lists 
  
 171. See id. at 252-274. 
 172. Improving Regulatory Performance: Lessons from the United Kingdom: 
Statement Presented to the S. Budget Comm. Task Force on Gov’t Performance 4 
(2011) (statement of Michael Greenstone) [hereinafter Improving Regulatory 
Performance: Lessons from the United Kingdom], available at 
budget.senate.gov/democratic/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=b1b6d27f-8f1c-4370-
a42e-432ebf4d8885 (proposing a new office, modeled on the Congressional 
Budget Office and housed within Congress, to evaluate the effects of 
implemented regulations); see also Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg., 3822 
(Jan. 18, 2011), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-
1385.pdf (requiring agencies to “consider how best to promote retrospective 
analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively 
burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance 
with what has been learned”).  
 173. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822. 
 174. Improving Regulatory Performance: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 
supra note 172, at 3.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Other scholarship suggests that similar reviews can benefit intra-
governmental practices as well. See Shapiro & Morrall III, supra note 29, at 190 
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inherit the unrealistic optimism and confidence of the 
bodies that create them. That self-confidence encourages 
the ossification of evaluative approaches to a dynamic 
object; it also encourages some sloppiness in applying the 
evaluative approaches.178 Building in updating mechanisms 
could check these unrealistic impulses by incorporating 
evolving understandings of the phenomena that databases 
address. And it would allow databases to keep up with the 
changing nature of these phenomena—facts on the 
ground—which themselves react and change in response to 
government actions.179  
Building in feedback and updating mechanisms would 
also help alert government bodies to mismatches between 
the criteria used to make predictions and the kind of 
prediction being made.180 That kind of mismatch is evident 
  
(finding that increasing information used for benefit-cost analysis did not 
increase the benefits of regulations, and that political salience decreased them). 
 178. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST 
NOMINATION PRACTICES, supra note 53, at v, vi, 1 (finding the process for listing 
individuals who are not currently under investigation by the FBI on FBI 
terrorist watch lists flawed: the agency routinely failed to follow its own policy 
for reviewing proposals to include new names on the watch lists; had “no formal 
or active process to update or remove” names that had not been reviewed; and 
commonly included names with “little or no information explaining why the 
subject may have a nexus to terrorism”; the agency had no way to remove or 
modify entries submitted via particular routes; and 35% of the over 68,000 
identities originating from FBI watch lists were “associated with FBI cases that 
did not contain current . . . terrorism designations,” but rather arose from cases 
that had been closed or were “unrelated to terrorism”). 
 179. See, e.g., HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE, supra note 81, at 2 (noting 
that descriptions of and theories about human conduct tend to have a “feedback 
effect” that affects the very conduct they address). Hacking focuses on social-
scientific descriptions and theories, but the point applies with equal force to 
government-based understandings of human conduct, which are themselves 
often based on social-scientific theories and their popularizations, as well as 
prevalent social attitudes more generally. Perhaps most crucially, government-
based understandings can act on the world in even more powerful ways than 
social-scientific theories, for instance by subjecting classes of people to legal 
requirements or increased attention from government agents.  
 180. Cf. HARCOURT, supra note 33, at 23. Harcourt argues that the goal of 
profiling—to catch criminal acts within a particular population—can be 
counterproductive to achieving the broader goal of law enforcement—to reduce 
crime in general—because the profiled population may reduce its criminal 
behavior less than the non-profiled population may increase its own criminal 
behavior. See id. In other words, Harcourt argues, even though profiling is used 
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in the FBI’s VGTOF list, which connects gang-based criteria 
to terrorist conduct.181  
Several factors can help indicate how attenuated 
predictive criteria are from the conduct predicted ex ante. 
We can ask how precise the criteria are. Do they pick out 
specific facts that are easily distinguished from other facts, 
or are they fairly mushy? We can ask how standard the 
criteria are. Do they compel a particular prediction across 
evaluators, or do they leave a lot of room for individual 
interpretation? And we can ask how well articulated the 
theory underlying the criteria is. Is there a strong argument 
that the criteria actually identify the conduct the database 
addresses?  
Most importantly, however, the relation of criteria to 
prediction is open to empirical testing ex post.182 Feedback 
and updating mechanisms should compel those who 
maintain predictive government databases to evaluate 
whether the information they use actually serves, over time, 
to pick out the conduct they target.  
For example, the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (NSEERS), which required people from 
certain countries to register with DHS upon arrival in the 
United States and at regular intervals thereafter, was 
meant to address national security threats.183 Based on an 
implicit prediction that visitors from particular countries 
would pose heightened national security threats, this 
database contained information about the identities and 
location of immigrants and visitors from twenty-five 
countries.184 But the extent to which simply having that 
information effectively targeted national security risks was 
  
as a tool of law enforcement, the effects of profiling turn out to be inconsistent 
with the goals of law enforcement. See id. 
 181. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 182. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 183. The countries whose residents were required to register were: 
“Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen.” Removing Designated Countries From the National Security 
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 76 Fed. Reg. 23,830 (Apr. 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter Removing Designated Countries From NSEERS].  
 184. See id. 
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low: a review of publicly available information about the 
program found it “unsuccessful as a counterterrorism 
tool.”185 Its main effect was to net ordinary people who had 
overstayed their visas or failed to comply with the 
somewhat arcane NSEERS requirements themselves.186  
It seems likely that DHS evaluated the actual results of 
NSEERS and noted the internal inconsistency of 
information with target, because the NSEERS program was 
suspended in 2011 in order to “eliminate redundancies; 
streamline the collection of data for individuals entering or 
exiting the United States, regardless of nationality; and 
enhance the capabilities of our security personnel.”187 
The more the criteria used to make a watch list 
prediction are attenuated from the conduct predicted, then, 
the more we can expect a watch list to miss its purpose of 
predicting specific conduct on the part of particular 
people.188 Requiring databases to include provisions for 
feedback-based revision may help counteract such 
inconsistencies. 
Finally, one implication of studies like James Scott’s is 
that a watch list built on an assumption that its standards 
are objective and its knowledge totalizing will inevitably 
confuse the priorities of its creators with the realities of its 
objects.189 Similarly, when the subjective elements of 
prediction are obscured, those making and using databases 
may easily mistake opinion for fact. To counteract these 
  
 185. PENN STATE UNIV., DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW, NSEERS: THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S EFFORTS TO SECURE ITS BORDERS, 6 (Mar. 31, 2009), 
www.adc.org/PDF/nseerspaper.pdf. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Important NSEERS Information, IMMIGRATION DAILY (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0524-nseers.shtm; see 
Removing Designated Countries From NSEERS, supra note 183, at 23,831. 
DHS has not technically cancelled NSEERS but only suspended it by relieving 
any visitors from its reporting requirements. The regulations creating the 
program are still in effect, and the program thus stands ready to be re-
implemented at any time.  
 188. Cf. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2007) (arguing that bureaucracies created for limited 
civilian purposes will predictably fail when pressed into national security 
service because of a mismatch of goals and techniques).  
 189. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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results, an effective legal regime for predictive government 
databases should require that watch lists acknowledge the 
subjective and partial nature of their predictions and, if 
possible, use them to the watch lists’ advantage by 
encouraging better judgment in government agents. 
Instead, watch lists are often structured to obscure their 
dependence on judgment, phrasing their evaluative process 
in objective terms—as though the mere existence of 
information itself necessitated certain predictions. This 
misrepresents the actual evaluative process of prediction, 
which requires that information be interpreted.  
Agents and agencies facing outside audiences may 
naturally be tempted to present watch listing processes as 
more objective than they really are. But such 
representations may also obscure the role of subjective 
judgment to internal audiences: the very agents making the 
predictions. Agents exercising their subjective judgment 
may be encouraged to think of their activity as merely 
reading truth off of information. Such misunderstandings 
exacerbate the self-blinding effects of overconfidence. 
Acknowledging subjective components, in contrast, can 
increase users’ awareness of the limitations and quirks of 
database predictions. Combined with external feedback, it 
can also help governments harness subjectivity by focusing 
training or changing criteria based on the database’s real-
world performance.  
B. Directions for Reform 
How can we include feedback, updating, internal 
consistency, and acknowledged subjectivity in watch lists to 
counteract their perverse incentives? The clearest route 
would be statutory: Congress should amend the Privacy Act 
to eliminate or tighten the exemptions to its relevance, 
timeliness, completeness, and accuracy requirements.190 
This would affect many databases, not just watch lists. But 
the effect would be salutary. In areas where certainty is 
relatively easy to achieve—either because the database 
merely compiles independently existing information or 
because its predictions are well-tested and based on a 
  
 190. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) (2006). 
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wealth of historical data—the requirements should be 
relatively simple to fulfill.  
In areas of high uncertainty like terrorist watch lists, in 
contrast, imposing these requirements would push agencies 
to consider what relevance, timeliness, completeness, and 
accuracy means in a particular context. The agency could 
define these statutory terms in regulations specific to each 
particular watch list, which would require it to determine 
what level of relevance, timeliness, completeness, and 
accuracy was appropriate for that watch list. This process 
would encourage agencies to gather evidence about how 
watch list predictions fare in the real world in order to 
determine what the statutory terms should mean in any 
given context.  
The agency’s definition of these statutory terms should 
appear in the System of Records Notice the Privacy Act 
already requires when a database is created or modified.191 
This would require the agency to consider the purpose of its 
predictions and think about how they relate to their real-
world objects.192 It would provide pre-articulated standards 
that would render the database amenable to external or 
internal audits.193 And it would increase the transparency of 
watch lists, allowing executive actors, legislators, and the 
public to evaluate them.  
For instance, an early articulation of how the VGTOF’s 
criteria were meant to pinpoint terrorist activity might have 
alerted the agency to the potential mismatch of some 
criteria to the database’s target. If such an articulation 
would reveal sensitive information, the modified Privacy 
Act provision could contain a secrecy clause allowing 
agencies to make the articulation internally, or to 
Congressional bodies only.194 While a public enunciation of 
standards facilitates widespread evaluation of the social 
effects of a watch list, the main thrust of my proposal is that 
  
 191. § 552a(e)(4). 
 192. Such standards might resemble the data “minimization” efforts that the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires before information may be 
shared. See 150 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006). 
 193. See Cuéllar, supra note 167, at 285-86. 
 194. Cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 334-35 (2010) 
(proposing that government secrets should be revealed to different publics 
depending on their level of sensitivity). 
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explicit articulation—even to limited audiences—should be 
part of the process of developing such databases. 
Once a watch list is developed, moreover, agencies 
should be required to subject it to regular investigation to 
determine how it actually functions. A Privacy Act 
amendment should require agencies to develop ongoing 
evaluations of how watch list predictions hold up. The 
outlines of the assessment protocol should be provided in 
the System of Records Notice, which should explain how the 
agency plans to review the watch list’s efficacy and how 
often it plans to implement reviews.  
These evaluations should be tied to ongoing revisions of 
predictions and predictive processes, so that updating is a 
natural and continuous result of feedback. Self-
assessments, in other words, should be followed by 
improvements based upon them. The same Privacy Act 
amendment should require agencies to update their System 
of Records Notice for each watch list periodically to explain, 
in general terms, what self-assessment has revealed and 
what the agency will do about it. Such a process would 
make watch lists more efficacious and more transparent. It 
would also serve as a signal to agents and agencies that 
watch list judgments are imperfect and subject to 
modification. A fuller report distributed to relevant agency 
personnel should detail watch list failings, which would also 
help keep agents aware of the quality of their predictions. 
The agency’s feedback and updating approach, 
furthermore, should itself be subject to external reviews. 
These investigations could take a variety of forms. They 
may involve in-depth audits of database predictions like 
those suggested by Cuéllar for other discretionary 
practices.195 They may also, on the model of scientific 
studies, include long-term studies of specific watch-listed 
subjects to determine the extent to which predictions or 
investigative actions based on these evaluations turn out to 
be reliable.196  
  
 195. See Cuéllar, supra note 167, at 232, 252-74.  
 196. This resembles the retrospective review of actual policy effects suggested 
by Greenstone in Improving Regulatory Performance: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom, supra note 172, at 3, and initiated by Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 3822, at 3822. 
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A Privacy Act amendment is the best way to impose 
these new constraints. But an agency concerned with the 
efficacy of its watch list could implement these proposals on 
its own. Although a change in incentive structure might 
work best when imposed by the legislature, an agency 
leadership dedicated to efficacy can implement such change 
from the inside.  
Another agency-internal change that would improve 
watch list judgments would remind evaluators of the 
subjective nature of their evaluations. Such efforts might 
include reverting to more narrative, explanatory approaches 
that require agents not only to provide information 
supporting their predictions but also to make explicit their 
own interpretations of that information. This approach 
would counteract the implications of objectivity that 
checklists of criteria create.  
Narrative explanations should be included in ongoing 
reviews to help determine how government agents actually 
make predictions about terrorist conduct. They could also be 
subjected to dialogue and dissent by having several agents 
participate in making a prediction.197 This would increase 
attention to reasoning and evaluative processes and 
awareness of personal predilections.  
Of course, these are not simple fixes, and they are not 
guaranteed to work. Promoting dialogue may exacerbate 
patterns of weak reasoning or encourage groupthink or 
reasoning to extremes. At the same time, this approach 
might at least remind agents that evaluation, rather than 
merely information collection, is the central step in watch 
list predictions.   
These may seem like costly measures to take simply to 
manage a list. Watch lists, after all, are not generally seen 
to be a method of implementing or creating policy. They are 
merely a tool for keeping track of those that policy 
addresses. But this view accepts the seemingly neutral, 
objective nature of databases. If databases are mere 
repositories of information available for other uses, there 
seems little point in expending effort to control them.  
  
 197. Such a dialogic endeavor resembles so-called red team analysis or 
“[d]issent [c]hannel” provisions that aim to encourage productive internal 
disagreements. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 2328. 
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But if we see watch lists as themselves creating 
knowledge through the evaluation of individuals, the 
question of costs looks different. The classification of 
individuals in watch lists can have profound implications 
for how they can live their lives. And the facts that watch 
lists report about our world can influence our policies: how 
much effort we want to spend on combating terrorism and 
what kind of effort we think will work. In this way, watch 
lists become black boxes undergirding larger theories, 
policies, and worldviews.198 They tell us what our social 
world looks like: who inhabits it and what dangers it poses. 
And we use what they tell us without knowing how they 
came to their conclusions or how valid those conclusions 
are. In this light, it becomes more important to assess how 
much the facts that watch lists produce correspond with 
reality. 
CONCLUSION 
A. Other Predictive Databases  
This Article has focused on terrorist watch lists. But 
terrorist watch lists are just one example of a type: 
government databases used to predict human conduct. Such 
databases will be subject to radically different incentive 
structures than those surrounding terrorist watch lists. For 
instance, correct predictions in some databases have a clear 
monetary payoff and operate in relatively low-salience 
fields. When that is the case, we can expect agencies to 
incorporate self-assessment mechanisms naturally into 
their predictive processes. Self-assessment is relatively easy 
when money is at stake both because the accuracy of a 
prediction is presented in clear terms and because monetary 
value makes the relationship between false negatives and 
false positives easier to quantify. And lower salience puts 
less pressure on agencies to appear active, allowing for 
simpler ways to implement corrections that improve 
efficacy.  
  
 198. Cf. LATOUR, supra note 66, at 130-31 (arguing that scientific citation 
itself, quite aside from experimental proof, has a fact-making power, because 
repeated citation of a claim based on an experiment tends to give the claim an 
unquestionable factual status in the community of scientists, rendering the 
original evidence and analysis on which the claim was based a “black box” 
impervious to further investigation). 
2013] TERRORIST WATCH LISTS 531 
But in similarly high-salience fields with no clear way of 
quantifying accuracy, we can expect databases used for 
prediction to face similar problems as terrorist watch lists. 
This is so irrespective of whether the databases are created 
and managed by administrative agencies, as terrorist watch 
lists are, or by Congress itself. For instance, Congress has 
required all states to keep publicly accessible registries of 
convicted sex offenders.199 The government itself does not 
offer a prediction in this case. It only mandates the 
disclosure of information so that individual members of the 
public may make their own predictions about the convict’s 
future conduct.200 At the same time, that mandate also 
implies that this is the information the public needs to form 
a reliable assessment: the concept of an offender registry is 
based on the implicit prediction that people convicted of 
certain crimes are likely to recidivate.  
Yet empirical research has repeatedly called into 
question the predictive utility of previous sex offenses for 
recidivism.201 And neither the statute nor its implementing 
  
 199. See generally Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. 109-248, 120 Stat 587, 596 (2006) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 16912 (2006). 
 200. See id. This is a form of “mandated disclosure.” See Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 
649 (2011). Ben-Shahar and Schneider explain that “[t]he technique requires 
‘the discloser’ to give ‘the disclosee’ information which the disclosee may use to 
make better decisions and to keep the discloser from abusing its superior 
position.” Id. The aim is “to improve decisions people make in their economic 
and social relationships and particularly to protect the naive from the 
sophisticated.” Id. Ben-Shahar and Schneider document the failure of mandated 
disclosure to achieve these goals and present a number of reasons for that 
failure. See id. at 679 (beginning discussion of reasons for failure). One benefit 
of subjecting registries to the self-assessment mechanisms I propose discussion 
supra Part V.B., is in revealing which registries fail to achieve their goals and 
why. 
 201. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS 
IN THE US, 3, 9 (Sept. 2007), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
us0907webwcover.pdf (documenting the absence of “convincing evidence of 
public safety gains” from registration requirements and noting that such 
requirements may be “counterproductive” because “the proliferation of people 
required to register” for non-serious crimes “makes it harder for law 
enforcement to determine which [registrants] warrant careful monitoring”). 
Registration also diverts law enforcement resources to tracking registrants, 
determining who has failed to register, and prosecuting those who do so, even 
though these expenditures do little to effectuate the database’s goal of lowering 
the incidence of and opportunity for sex crime commission. See, e.g., Andrew J. 
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regulations articulate a theory of recidivism to explain the 
registration requirements. It may well be that registration 
prevents recidivism. But it may also be that severe 
registration requirements inspire greater efforts to avoid 
registration and divert law enforcement attention from sex 
offense to registration maintenance. Without articulating 
how the requirements relate to the law’s goals, it is difficult 
for the government to assess the system’s internal 
consistency and efficacy.202 
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”), which is the sex offender registration statute, 
does leave an avenue open for self-assessment: it requires 
the Attorney General to constitute a task force to study the 
relative merits of individualized risk assessments versus 
registration based on conviction category.203 However, the 
  
Harris and Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky, Implementing the Adam Walsh 
Act’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Provisions: A Survey of the 
States, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 202, 203 (2010) (noting that no state had 
achieved compliance with the statute’s registration requirements by the 
deadline of July 2009); Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed 
Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH L. REV. 993, 1009 n.96 
(2010) (noting the high costs of implementing the statute’s registration and 
notification requirements and quoting the California Sex Offender Management 
Board as stating that this cost would exceed the amount of federal funding that 
California would forego if it failed to implement the statute’s provisions). 
 202. For instance, noting that “SORNA’s tiering structure” does not 
“supersede[]” but supplements local “jurisdictions’ existing risk assessment 
processes” for sex offenders, the DOJ has called the notion that the tiering 
structure “is meant to help predict sexual reoffense” a “misconception.” DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, 
REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, SMARTWATCH, SORNA: ADDRESSING THE 
CHALLENGES (2009), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/smartwatch/09_august/SORNA_challenges.html
; see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006) (defining the sec offender tiers). But it is unclear 
what purpose other than prediction the system could serve, and the DOJ 
instructions do not suggest any. The statute itself states that it was passed “[i]n 
order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children,” 
which suggests that tiers are allocated based on the likelihood of offense. 42 
U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). This mismatch between the official explanation of the 
statute and the statute’s only apparent purpose makes it yet more difficult to 
assess the database’s effects. 
 203. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 § 637, 120 Stat. at 
645-46. The statute requires the Attorney General to present the task force’s 
conclusions to Congress within 18 months of SORNA’s passage, but a search of 
the Department of Justice website produced no such study.  
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statute contains no provisions for updating or evaluation of 
the extent to which the registry serves its goals at all.  
None of these defects should be surprising given the 
analysis in this article. Sex offenses, like terrorism, are a 
complex, high-salience area with a limited amount of 
historical data on which to base predictions and no clear 
monetary payoff for correct predictions. We should expect 
government databases in this arena to be internally 
inconsistent, to contain few self-assessment mechanisms, to 
rely on implicit assumptions rather than articulated 
theories, and to appear more objective than they really are. 
While my proposals would work differently in the legislative 
arena of SORNA—where Congress would have to impose 
limits not just on agencies, but on itself—the substance and 
logic carry over. As government databases continue 
growing, moreover, and as their uses continue to expand, we 
can expect ever more databases to be used for prediction, 
and ever more to suffer from the problems I have described.  
B. Dilemmas of Knowledge 
This Article has drawn attention to the distinctive 
features of terrorist watch lists and other databases used to 
predict human conduct. I have argued that characteristics 
such as ease of combination, portability, 
decontextualization, impersonality, and diffusion of 
evaluative labor can make such databases powerful. But 
these same characteristics can also undermine them, 
causing problems for the agencies that maintain them, the 
governments that commission them, and the public they 
serve.  
Despite this potential for harm, the legal regime that 
constrains government databases recognizes only the harms 
they cause individuals, such as producing inaccurate 
records, invading privacy, and, at the margins, infringing a 
right to travel. I have proposed addressing that legal lacuna 
by requiring such databases to build in efficacy standards; 
to test and revise their prediction protocols; and to make 
their subjective elements explicit to those who use them.   
My analysis raises two related conundrums. First, the 
conundrum of overconfidence and self-correction. I conclude 
above that states trust their conclusions at their peril, and 
that attempts at ultimate, total knowledge will predictably 
fail. I propose a way to guard against this failure: give up 
attempts at total knowledge; assume that any prediction 
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will be partial and have flaws; construct databases with 
ongoing self-correction mechanisms to account for inevitable 
failures.  
But the solution seems to ignore the problem. Doesn’t 
this attempt at self-correction display the very self-
aggrandizing overconfidence it is meant to combat? Can we 
avoid overconfidence in results by substituting 
overconfidence in methods?  
There is no satisfying way out of this contradiction, 
which pits our increasing knowledge of the world against 
our increasing understanding that knowledge is always 
limited. The real answer to the conundrum would be to 
eliminate predictive government databases altogether. But 
we have known for decades that modern states are defined 
by their production of knowledge about their populations. 
The portable, combinable, diffuse nature of predictive 
government database use is, in turn, characteristic of 
modern forms of knowledge more generally. Calling for the 
elimination of such databases altogether would be asking 
the scorpion not to sting the frog. My proposals are thus not 
solutions to the underlying problem, but ways to soften its 
worst symptoms.  
Second, I state above that the broader normative issues 
that these databases raise have to do with how people 
conceptualize their society. Governmental predictions create 
social categories that affect social structure and political 
policy. But the reforms I propose do not stop governments 
from making predictions or having social effects. Doesn’t 
insisting on better categories miss the point?  
Again, there is no ultimate solution: government 
representations will always affect, and not just reflect, the 
societies they represent. Again, all we can strive for is 
amelioration. The first step is recognition: the effects of 
government pronouncements go deeper when they are not 
recognized as effects at all. Requiring watch lists to confront 
their users with the complexities of their internal 
production and with the vagaries of the world they analyze 
brings their contingencies to the fore. That will not be the 
last word on the issue of their social effects. But it would 
allow us to start a conversation about them.  
Government databases used for predictions about 
human conduct are currently treated as neutral 
instruments of government policy. Bringing their 
limitations and effects to the surface refigures them as 
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creative creatures that can affect policy as well. That 
provides a first step toward dealing with their normative 
implications. Both the dilemma of knowledge and the 
inevitability of effects admit of only partial solutions; but 
partial solutions are better than none at all. 
